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In the mid-eighties, about half the OECD countries imposed an annual net wealth
tax, but today it is maintained solely by Spain, Norway and Switzerland (OECD,
2018). However, rising wealth inequality1 has revived the debate about the de-
sirability of wealth taxes, not only in academic but also in political and public
circles.2 To date, though, there is a lack of convincing empirical evidence about
the behavioural responses associated with wealth taxation that might help ana-
lysts form a well-grounded position on the need to implement such a tax (Seim,
2017; Brülhart et al., 2017; Zoutman, 2018; Londoño Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha,
2019; Jacobsen et al., 2019).
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to contribute to this literature by studying how
taxpayers reacted to the reintroduction of the Spanish Net Wealth Tax in 2011.
Spain provides a good setting in which to study this tax given that it is one of
the few countries that continues to impose it. Moreover, it is generally accepted
that tax evasion is more widespread here than in other European countries, so our
results might have relevant tax policy implications. Finally, behavioural responses
to wealth taxes in the country have not been previously examined.3
In Spain, wealth taxation has been transferred to sub-central governments, who
have the legislative power to determine certain aspects of its structure. This is
particularly relevant when we consider the reintroduction of the tax and its imple-
mentation. For this reason, in this study we have opted to focus on one of these
sub-central governments (also for questions of data availability), that of Catalonia,
which is in fact the region that collects the highest share of Spain’s overall wealth
tax revenues (about 52% in 20114 and 46% in 20155).
Using a panel of tax return micro-data from the universe of Catalan wealth tax-
payers between 2011 and 2015, we analyse whether wealth taxes affect wealth
1Following Piketty (2014), several studies have attempted to estimate the evolution of wealth
concentration. Zucman (2019) provides a review.
2Clear evidence of this is the recent wealth tax proposal made by a US senator, Elizabeth
Warren: https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senator-warren-
unveils-proposal-to-tax-wealth-of-ultra-rich-americans.
Evidence from the opposite camp comes from France, where the abolition of the net wealth tax in
January 2018 led to social unrest, its reinstatement being one of the key demands of yellow vest





3There exist other studies analysing the Spanish Wealth Tax (e.g. Alvaredo and Saez, 2009;
Durán-Cabré and Esteller-Moré, 2010) but they focus mainly on the evolution of wealth concen-









accumulation and taxable wealth. Additionally, we identify potential avoidance
strategies attributable to the design of the Wealth Tax, related primarily to tax
exemptions and the existence of a limit on wealth tax liability. Specifically, we
examine whether taxpayers reorganize their wealth composition and change the
realization of income to benefit from them. Moreover, we also look at the effect
of wealth taxes on (reported) gifts. Finally, we seek to verify whether there is a
positive relation between wealth tax rates and the probability of a taxpayer not
filing wealth tax returns in subsequent years.
As there are no data for the period when the wealth tax was not being imposed,
we take advantage of the unexpected reintroduction of the tax by the Catalan
Government at the end of 2011. This serves as our control year. We use the vari-
ation in treatment exposure, measured through the average tax rates for 2011, to
identify the effects of the wealth tax. This variation, driven mainly by different
ratios of taxable wealth over total reported wealth and different shares of realized
long-term capital gains over taxable income, occurs not only across different levels
of wealth, but also within similar levels. Hence, we control non-parametrically for
taxpayers’ 2011 wealth, income, asset portfolio, age and other relevant character-
istics.
When focusing on a balanced panel of the top 50% richest taxpayers, our results
show that the taxpayers’ response to the reintroduction of the wealth tax was
significant. This translates into an elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the
net-of-tax rate of return of 0.64, or, put differently, a 0.1 percentage point increase
in the average wealth tax rate leads to a reduction in taxable wealth of 3.24% over
4 years. This effect reflects avoidance rather than real responses. Indeed, while
facing higher wealth taxes does not have a negative effect on savings, it does en-
courage taxpayers to change their asset and income composition to take advantage
of wealth tax exemptions (mostly business-related) and the limit on wealth tax li-
ability. The intensity of the responses varies depending on the initial importance
of taxpayers’ business shares, favouring the use of business exemptions over the
limit on tax liability if initial business shares are high, and vice versa. Overall,
these avoidance responses are high in terms of tax revenues, representing a 4-year
accumulated revenue loss that is 2.6 times the 2011 estimated wealth tax revenues.
As such, this paper provides new empirical evidence to the nascent literature study-
ing behavioural responses to wealth taxation. According to the specific methodol-
ogy applied, the existing literature can be divided into two main groups: one em-
ploys bunching strategies (Seim, 2017; Londoño Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha, 2019)
while the other undertakes difference-in-differences and cross-sectional analyses
(Brülhart et al., 2017; Zoutman, 2018; Jacobsen et al., 2019).6 The former report
much smaller taxable wealth responses to wealth taxes than the latter, primarily
reflecting tax evasion.7 The mechanisms driving such large responses in the latter
studies are unclear.
6Note, however, that Brülhart et al. (2017) and Jacobsen et al. (2019) complement their
main findings with bunching evidence.
7The specific magnitudes as reported in individual studies are detailed below in the Results
section.
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Seim (2017) uses Swedish administrative data and exploits the variation across
wealth tax brackets, while Brülhart et al. (2017) exploit the variation in wealth tax
rates across the Swiss Cantons and municipalities. Jacobsen et al. (2019) employ
Danish administrative data and consider two different sources of variation: first,
changes in the exemption threshold for couples and, second, changes in marginal
tax rates for taxpayers unbound by a tax ceiling. Zoutman (2018) uses a Dutch
capital-income and wealth tax reform that created variation in the rate-of-return
after taxation at each level of income and wealth and, finally, Londoño Vélez and
Ávila-Mahecha (2019) draw on Colombian administrative data and exploit the
time variation derived from several wealth tax reforms and discontinuities in the
wealth tax schedule.
The main contribution of our paper - which by methodology belongs to the second
group of studies identified above - is that it provides both an assessment of the
effect of wealth taxes on taxable wealth and an analysis of other types of response,
focused above all on tax avoidance strategies, which allows us to provide evidence
of the mechanisms driving the results. Thus, the paper also contributes to the lit-
erature on capital taxation and portfolio choice.8 While most earlier studies have
sought to analyse the effect of personal income taxes on investment in financial
assets9, this paper provides evidence on asset portfolio responses to wealth taxa-
tion, not only in terms of financial assets, but also that of housing and businesses.
On the one hand, higher tax rates lead taxpayers to increase the importance of
their exempt assets - in the main their company holdings - although we also find
a statistically significant (albeit small) effect on their main dwelling exemption.
This finding is in accordance with the empirically documented use of closely-held
businesses as tax shelters (Alstadsæter, Kopczuk and Telle, 2014). On the other
hand, higher tax rates lead taxpayers to increase the importance they attach to
listed equity and investment funds, which enables them to exploit the tax liability
limit.
Likewise, in relation to the application of this limit, our paper documents that
facing higher tax rates results in taxpayers reducing their taxable income and in-
creasing the importance of their long-term capital gains within realized income.
In this regard, our study contributes to the extant literature on the responses of
taxable income to personal income taxes (see Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012) for
a general review and Neisser (2018) for an empirical review) and to the literature
studying the effect of taxes on capital gains realizations10. Finally, we provide
8See Schalck (2017), Bergstresser and Pontiff (2013), Desai and Dharmapala (2011), Alan
et al. (2010), Poterba and Samwick (2002). For a review of the earlier literature, see Poterba
(2002).
9One exception is Bergstresser and Pontiff (2013), who also consider corporate income tax-
ation.
10Some recent empirical studies include Jacob (2018, 2016, 2013), Dı́az-Caro and Crespo-
Cebada (2016) and Daunfeldt, Praski-St̊ahlgren and Rudholm (2010). In general, they study
the effect of capital gains taxation on their realization (also known as the lock-in effect) with
the exception of Jacob (2016), who studies the effect of labour income taxes on capital gains
realizations. For a broad review of capital gains responses to taxes, see Hanlon and Heitzman
(2010). With a particular focus on the wealthiest individuals, Auerbach, Burman and Siegel
(2000) show that it is in fact the high-income, high-wealth and more sophisticated taxpayers
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evidence of gift responses to wealth taxes, which in turn can be related to the
literature studying the effect of gifts and estate taxation on inter-vivos transfers
(see Kopczuk, 2016, for a review)11. Unlike the former responses, the increase in -
reported - gifts does not persist over time, only being documented during the first
two years after the reintroduction of the tax.
The main conclusion we draw from this study is that wealth taxes do not reduce
wealth accumulation, and that the taxpayers most affected by the reintroduction
of the tax manage to reduce their tax liability significantly by employing avoidance
strategies. These responses are estimated by examining the top 50% richest tax-
payers that submit wealth tax returns every year. In addition, we find a positive
relation between the 2011 wealth tax rates and subsequent non-tax filing. Thus,
in broad terms, this paper contributes to the literature on capital and estate tax-
ation (see Kopczuk, 2016, for a review) and to that on tax avoidance and evasion
(Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002; Slemrod, 2018).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the specific charac-
teristics of the Spanish Wealth Tax and the circumstances surrounding its reintro-
duction in 2011. Section 3 presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section 4
outlines the methodology employed. Section 5 shows the estimation results; and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Spanish Wealth Tax: Evolution and characteristics
The Spanish Wealth Tax was first introduced in 1977 as an extraordinary and
temporary measure, but after more than fifteen years the temporary nature of the
tax was revoked by Act 19/1991. Until that moment, the wealth tax had mainly
been used as an instrument for census and control purposes. However, four addi-
tional objectives were pursued with the wealth tax reform: taxing the additional
ability to pay derived from wealth holdings; achieving a better allocation of re-
sources; serving as a redistributive tool and complementing personal income tax
and inheritance and gift tax.12
The Wealth Tax is levied annually on December 31 and applies to all forms of
wealth: real estate, bank accounts, bonds, shares, investment funds, life insur-
ance, vehicles, boats, aircrafts, jewellery, art and antiques, intellectual or indus-
trial property rights, etc. However, the legislation has incorporated a number of
exemptions: starting in 1991 with elements of historical heritage, art treasures,
pension plans and other financial rights13, wealth tax exemptions were extended
to business assets in 1994 and “closely-held” companies (both unlisted - in 1994 -
and listed - in 1998 -)14. Finally, main residences have been exempt from the tax
that are most likely to avoid capital gains taxation.
11In addition to studying the effect of estate and gift taxation on transfers, Joulfaian (2005)
also considers the impact of capital gains taxation.
12Memorandum of Act 19/1991, June 6.
13Limited up to a certain amount. For further information, see Article 4, Act 19/1991.
14Certain conditions must be satisfied for business assets and companies to be exempt from
the Wealth Tax. These requirements are not related to a firm’s size, but rather to a minimum
ownership share (5% individually or 20% within the family group), a minimum remuneration for
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(up to a limit) since 2000.
The Spanish Wealth Tax is only levied on taxable wealth exceeding a minimum
threshold, a limit that has been modified over time. Wealth tax returns have to be
submitted in two different situations: (i) when taxpayers face a positive tax liabil-
ity, or (ii) when, although their tax liability is zero because their taxable wealth
is below the threshold, their gross wealth (including both taxable and non-taxable
assets) is above a certain level15. Tax liability is obtained by applying progressive
tax rates16 to the net tax base, i.e. taxable wealth minus the minimum threshold.
Moreover, a limit exists on wealth tax liability; specifically, the law sets a ceiling
on wealth tax liability when taxable income is relatively low compared to taxable
wealth.17 It should be noted that, although forming part of the legal definition of
taxable income, long-term capital gains (i.e. those derived from assets owned for
longer than twelve months) are excluded from the ceiling computations.18
Although the main structure of the tax continues to be regulated by Spain’s Cen-
tral government, since the mid-1980s, wealth tax revenues have been transferred to
the regional governments. Some years later, they were also given some limited leg-
islative powers; thus, they can regulate the minimum threshold, tax rates and tax
credits. Additionally, they are also responsible for the administration and control
of the tax. This responsibility has been criticized for undermining the “control”
function of the tax, given the difficulties encountered by the central and regional
tax administrations to work together (Durán-Cabré and Esteller-Moré, 2007).
In addition to the greater fraud risk associated with low rates of tax control (Durán-
Cabré and Esteller-Moré, 2010), many experts have stressed the inefficiencies and
inequities derived from the design of this tax (i.e. assessment rules that differ
from market prices, tax exemptions, etc.).19 Apart from giving rise to horizontal
inequities among taxpayers with different asset portfolios but with similar levels
of wealth, its specific characteristics significantly distort the incidence and redis-
tributive role of the tax given that it is primarily the richest taxpayers who benefit
from them (e.g. Arcarons and Calonge, 2007; Alvaredo and Saez, 2009).
Taking into account these limitations, at the end of 2008 the Central government
the performance of managerial duties (by at least one member of the family group) and the fact
that the company carries out an economic activity. See Appendix A for further information.
15Two million euros in 2011 and 601,012.10 euros in 2007.
16Tax rates set by the Central government range from 0.2 to 2.5%.
17This limit on wealth tax liability is not unique to the Spanish Wealth Tax. For instance, in
France, some Swiss Cantons (OECD, 2018) and Denmark (Jacobsen et al., 2019) have operated
similar ceiling provisions. Indeed, Jacobsen et al. (2019) also exploit this tax feature.
18Specifically, overall wealth and income tax liabilities cannot exceed 60% of taxable income.
The excess, if any, is deducted from the initial wealth tax liability. However, this reduction cannot
exceed 80% of the initial wealth tax liability. In short: Limited wealth tax liability=MAX(60%
taxable income-income tax liability, 20% initial wealth tax liability), if [initial wealth tax liability
+ income tax liability]> 60% taxable income. Note that in these computations, the sum of long-
term capital gains and losses, if positive, is excluded from taxable income and the income tax
liability needs to be adjusted accordingly.
19Enciso (2006), Durán-Cabré and Esteller-Moré (2007, 2014), Fernández de Beaumont and
Mart́ın (2010), Carbajo (2015), among others.
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decided to abolish the tax given its inability to meet the objectives that justified
its introduction in the first place.20
2.1 The chaotic reintroduction of the Spanish Wealth Tax
Surprisingly, the same Central government who suppressed the tax at the end of
2008 decided to reintroduce it in 2011. The political party in power at that time -
the PSOE, occupying the centre-left of the political spectrum - opted to implement
the reform as a means of addressing the economic crisis. Its argument was that
those with more resources should be made to contribute more to the economic
recovery, and by so doing this would reinforce equity and allow a better redistri-
bution of income and wealth.
Thus, the tax was reintroduced in mid-September of 2011 as a transitory measure
and, a priori, it was only to be imposed in 2011 and 2012. However, the Budgetary
Laws passed in subsequent years have each extended this “transitory” measure and
the Spanish wealth tax remains in force. Two main changes were made with re-
spect to the regulation applicable in 2007: (i) the minimum threshold providing
exemption from tax liability was raised from 108,182.1821 to 700,000 euros and
(ii) the main residence exemption raised from 150,253.03 to 300,000 euros. These
changes sought to exempt the middle-classes from paying the tax.
The reintroduction of the tax was characterised by the confusion to which it gave
rise right up to the very last moment. In July 2011, a prominent member of the
PSOE party - standing for election at the November polls but not a member of
the existing cabinet - proposed the introduction of a Wealth Tax on the richest
Spaniards as part of its manifesto. The proposal came under heavy criticism from
many sides, but above all from that of the centre-right opposition party (PP), who
expressed its dismay at the fact that it had been the PSOE who had originally
abolished the tax at the beginning of its mandate. However, according to the
opinion polls, the PSOE had lost support during its second term in office to the
PP22, who adopted a clear position against the wealth tax. Thus, in summer 2011,
the proposal to reintroduce the wealth tax remained just that, a proposal.
Although the government ruled out any new tax reforms before the general elec-
tion23, rumours about an imminent reintroduction of the Wealth Tax emerged in
August 201124. The possibility was mentioned in various sources, even making the
20Memorandum IV of Act 4/2008, December 23. Due to legal constrains, the Wealth Tax Law
remained officially in force and Act 4/2008 simply introduced a 100% tax credit to the wealth
tax liability.
21Regional governments have legislative capacity to fix a different minimum threshold. Before
the abolishment of the tax, this ranged from 108,182.18 to 150,000 euros depending on the region,
where larger values were applied for specific situations.
22In particular, according to voter intention surveys carried out by CIS (Centro de Investiga-







front pages of several newspapers at the end of August2526. However, the Cen-
tral government remained equivocal on the matter27. On September 11, PSOE’s
general election candidate called on the government to reinstate the Wealth Tax,
generating criticism across the board: Right-wing parties condemned government
inconsistency in relation to the Wealth Tax, left-wing parties and organizations
considered it an insufficient and belated measure, and various groups of experts
stressed the inefficiencies and limitations of the tax.
The government failed to provide any specific details about the “new” Wealth Tax
until one day before its reintroduction28. On September 16, the Council of Minis-
ters agreed to its reinstatement and the legislation was modified accordingly29.
As discussed above, the Wealth Tax had been transferred to the Autonomous Com-
munities so it was they who would have the legislative power to decide whether
to levy it or not. Thus, even though the Central government had approved its
reintroduction, in the end it fell on the regional governments to implement it or
not. And, indeed, from the very outset, some of these governments, including
those of the Madrid Community and Catalonia, expressed their disagreement with
the measure.
Thus, the centre-right regional government in Madrid gave guarantees that it would
maintain the 100% tax credit introduced with the suppression of the tax, while
the centre-right nationalist Catalan government also expressed its opposition to
reintroducing the Wealth Tax, in line with the significant cuts to the Catalan
inheritance tax made earlier in June that same year. However, with the reform
passed, the Catalan government failed to legislate on the actual implementation of
the tax. Indeed, the Catalan government saw the reform as a short-lived measure,
given that the November General Elections were close and all the indications were
that the PP, who had come out against the reintroduction of the tax, would be
swept into power. This explains why the Catalan government postponed its deci-
sion on the Wealth Tax until the new Central government was formed.30
At the end of November 2011, the Catalan government announced that it would,
after all, levy the wealth tax, if the newly elected Central government decided to











29Real Decreto-ley 13/2011, de 16 de septiembre, por el que se restablece el Impuesto sobre el





the Catalan government confirmed that it would reintroduce the tax in Catalo-
nia, applying the same conditions foreseen in the state legislation32, and it was
not until March 2012 (with effect from December 31, 2011) that it approved the
corresponding legislative changes to implement the tax. Consequently, Catalan
taxpayers did not learn that they would have to pay the wealth tax corresponding
to 2011 until the end of that year, limiting their possibilities of responding to its
reintroduction.33
Some months later, towards the end of September 2012, the Central government
announced the extension of the Wealth Tax to 2013.34 Similarly, at the end of
September 2013, the government prolonged the tax again to 2014, and so on,
down to the present day. In Catalonia, at the end of 2012, the Catalan govern-
ment actually agreed to a slight increase in the wealth tax rates and lowered the
minimum threshold to 500,000 euros from 2012 onwards.35
2.2 How to avoid the Spanish wealth tax
Given the specific characteristics of the Spanish wealth tax, we need to comment
on the mechanisms that allow the tax liability to be reduced as this helps explain
the outcomes we present in our empirical analysis.
An obvious way to overcome the tax burden attributable to the progressivity of
the tax is by decreasing wealth. This can be achieved by making gifts, although
they are subject to gift taxes36. However, the design of the tax allows taxpayers
to adopt other strategies to reduce, or even eliminate, their tax liability without
decreasing their stock of wealth. Taxpayers do not even need to hire a tax advisor
- although many do - nor have a detailed knowledge of Tax Law to learn about






33There is anecdotal evidence in the form of readers’ letters to one of Catalonia’s leading
newspapers complaining about the impossibility of making plans with respect to the wealth tax
due to the lack of information and time constraints (see, for instance, La Vanguardia newspaper,




35Statutory wealth tax rates were increased by 5%, except for the last tax bracket (net tax
base above 10.7 million euros) were the increase was 10%.
36Gifts taxes depend on the family relationship between donor and recipient and on the
recipient’s region of residence. In Catalonia, for instance, tax rates range between 5-9% and
11.12-64% for gifts to close and distant relatives, respectively. Additionally, in the case of giving
real estate, the donor would face two taxes on capital gains (personal income tax and a local tax
on urban land transmissions).
37Google provides 16.5M entries (April 10, 2019) when searching Como pagar menos impuesto





These strategies are related to reducing taxable wealth in favour of exempt assets,
making use of the limit on wealth tax liability or changing tax residence to another
region where the wealth tax is not levied (e.g. Madrid). Examples for implement-
ing the first option include: i) changing fiscal residence to that of the dwelling with
the highest assessment so as to take advantage of the main-residence exemption38;
ii) saving through pension plans; iii) investing in art treasures; or iv) increasing
business exemptions. The taxpayer can achieve the latter by arranging their own
businesses/shares in such a way that they satisfy the exemption requirements fore-
seen in the Law (see Appendix A). If these conditions are already satisfied, the
exemption value can be increased by capitalizing the company, for instance. In the
case of the first three examples above, it should be stressed that their effectiveness
for reducing taxable wealth is limited as exemptions are bounded39.
The alternatives for exploiting the limit on wealth tax liability are also diverse.
They require the taxpayer to reduce realized income and to invest in assets that
can generate long-term capital gains40. Both options can be achieved by investing
in investment funds, since these assets do not generate regular income - such as
dividends or interest - but only capital gains (or losses) when sold. Shares are an-
other type of asset that can help the taxpayer benefit from the limit on tax liability.
Finally, the most radical strategy would be to move to Madrid, where the wealth
tax is not levied (and other taxes, such as personal income tax, are also lower).
However, if a tax audit were to be conducted the taxpayer would have to demon-
strate that this change of fiscal residence was neither fictitious nor motivated by
reasons of tax avoidance.
The most convenient strategy depends on the income-wealth ratio and the asset
portfolio of each taxpayer. For instance, for those who already own a business
it might be easier and less costly to take advantage of the business exemption.
Alternatively, those who have lower income and significant investments in financial
assets might find it easier to benefit from the limit on tax liability. Taxpayers with




38This can only be done if the taxpayer owns several housing properties. According to the
Spanish Survey of Household Finances (wave 2011), 89% of individuals in the last decile of
wealth distribution - that is, those most comparable to the population under study - own other
real estate properties besides their main dwelling (Banco de España, 2014).
39Main residence exemption is limited up to 300,000 euros. The yearly contribution to pension
plans was limited to 10,000 euros (12,500 euros for those older than 50). The exemption on art
treasures depends on the type of asset and ranges from 2,404.05 to 90,151.82 euros.
40As explained at the beginning of Section 2, long-term capital gains are excluded from the
computation of the limit on wealth tax liability.
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3 The data
The main data source used in this paper is the universe of anonymized wealth tax
returns filed by Catalan tax residents for the years 2011 to 2015. We have com-
plemented this database with an indicator of the taxpayer’s age and information
from inheritance and gift tax returns.41 All the data have been provided by the
Catalan Tax Agency.
The main database contains, at the micro level, all the information reported in the
wealth tax returns aggregated by types of asset. That is, the total stock of wealth
classified into real estate and main residence exemption, bank accounts, business
assets, bonds, investment funds, non-exempted quoted shares and unlisted com-
panies, exempted quoted shares and unlisted companies, life insurance, vehicles,
jewellery, artwork, property rights and “other”, including all taxable wealth not
previously categorized. Unfortunately, some exempt assets such as historical her-
itage, art treasures and pension plans do not have to be reported, which might
underestimate the overall stock of taxpayers’ wealth. Nevertheless, according to
the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (SHF) - wave 2011 - conducted by
the Bank of Spain, assets of this type represent a small fraction (around 4%) of
households’ net wealth.42 Apart from wealth portfolio, tax returns also include
information on total taxable income and personal income tax liability. Regard-
ing personal characteristics, little information is reported: just marital status and
place of residence. As previously mentioned, though, we are also able to consider
age.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for 2011 wealth tax returns.43 Statistics are
provided by wealth deciles and total number of observations. Here, certain features
should be stressed: i) as total reported wealth increases, the difference between
taxable wealth and total wealth also increases; and ii) there is significant variation
in the average tax rate within the same wealth decile. We return to this last point
in the following section. Figure 1 shows the average asset portfolio, including all
reported assets (both taxable and exempt), by wealth deciles. The importance of
unlisted companies increases with wealth, while the reverse occurs with real estate
properties and bank accounts or bonds.
The data from the 2011 tax returns submitted to the Catalan Tax Agency show
there were 42,294 tax filers facing a positive tax liability and 1,942 tax filers with
zero tax liability but gross wealth exceeding 2 million euros. Putting the total
number of tax filers - 44,236 - in perspective, they represent about 1.27% of per-
sonal income tax filers44 and about 0.59% of individuals residing in Catalonia in
41We are able to know whether a taxpayer dies after 2011 or has declared a gift from 2008
onwards.
42This figure can be extracted from Table 2(cont.) and Table 4(cont.) from Banco de España
(2014). We focus on the statistics for the last decile of the wealth distribution because it is the
most comparable to the population under study.
43All wealth tax filers are considered, that is, those who face a positive tax liability and
those who must submit the tax return because their overall gross wealth exceeds 2 million euros,
although their taxable base is below the minimum threshold.
44Information obtained from the statistics published by the Spanish Tax Administration:
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201145. Of these 2011 wealth tax filers, 36,373 (82.22%) continued to submit a
wealth tax return in 2015. Of the taxpayers who disappeared from the sample
(17.78%), 6.42% died and the remaining 11.36% disappeared for other reasons
(wealth losses, mobility, evasion, etc.). In our empirical analysis we exclude those
taxpayers that died. Additionally, we only consider those tax filers who submitted
the 2011 tax return, which means those taxpayers who began to submit wealth
tax returns later (from year 2012 onwards) are not included in our study. In fact,
most of our estimations use a balanced panel of tax filers from the top 50% of
the observed wealth distribution46, according to the stock of wealth reported in
2011, who submitted wealth tax returns consecutively between 2011 and 2015. We
provide further details about this in Section 4.
Finally, when a taxpayer voluntarily submits a supplementary return to declare
additional wealth, we consider this last return in our analysis. This was a quite
common occurrence among 2011 tax returns due to a tax amnesty issued by the
Central government in November 2012.47
3.1 Some descriptive facts on outcomes of interest
Table 2 shows the evolution taken by Wealth Tax revenues between 2011 and 2015.
Values are expressed in 2011 prices. The figures shown in Table 2 only consider
those tax filers who submitted, at least, a 2011 tax return. In the case of the
2011 wealth tax revenues, two different indicators are given: a) the amount of
revenues actually collected; and b) an estimation of the revenues that would have
been collected if the tax changes approved in 2012 had already been applied to
2011 wealth48. This estimation is provided to enable comparability across years.
A notable trend emerging from Table 2 is that wealth tax revenues decreased by
19.23% between 2011 and 2015. When considering just those taxpayers who sub-
mitted the tax return every year between 2011 and 2015, there was a fall of 3.64%.
Revenues fell by 8.37% when considering that group of taxpayers included in most
of our estimations, i.e. those placed among the top 50% of the observed wealth
distribution filing wealth tax returns every year. Another point that can be ex-
tracted from Table 2 is the importance, in terms of revenues, of taxpayers who
stop filing wealth tax returns. If we sum all collected revenues (2011.a to 2015) for
rows [1] and [2] we obtain 1,854M and 1,680M euros, respectively. This translates
into a wealth tax revenue loss of almost 174M euros (expressed in 2011 prices)




45Information obtained from the Catalan Statistical Institute: https://www.idescat.cat/
pub/?id=pmh&n=446.
46We focus on the top 50% of the wealth distribution derived from the population under study
(i.e. wealth tax filers) not from the entire population.
47The tax amnesty offered the possibility to regularize evaded income by paying a 10% tax
rate on the gross revenues generated during the last 4 years. Regularization of income implied
the declaration of wealth generating such income, and this is why many taxpayers presented a
supplementary wealth tax return. Indeed, 15.21% of 2011 tax filers submitted a supplementary
2011 wealth tax return around November 2012.
48See Section 2.1 for further information regarding wealth tax changes.
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2012-2015 period. Recall, of these 174M euros, only 17.88% can be explained by
taxpayers who died.
Table 3 provides some descriptive figures for the evolution of reported wealth and
tax avoidance strategies described in Section 2.2. All figures refer to taxpayers
placed at the top 50% of observed wealth distribution who filed wealth tax returns
every year between 2011 and 2015. Contrary to the evolution of wealth tax rev-
enues shown in row [3] of Table 2, overall reported wealth increased during this
period and, so, the latter does not seem to explain the former. This in turn sug-
gests there might be other factors, other than a fall in the stock of wealth (such
as the adoption of avoidance strategies), that are driving the reduction in tax rev-
enues. Indeed, a comparison of the 2011-2015 figures in Table 3 shows that the
relevance of wealth exemptions, assets that allow an investor to obtain long-term
capital gains and the limit on wealth tax liability have increased substantially over
time.
In the case of the strategy of changing tax residence to another region, the only
information available to us thus far is that 11.36% of 2011 tax filers disappeared
from the sample in subsequent years for reasons other than death. If we focus on
the 50% richest, the share is similar, at 10.15%. When looking at gifts reported
to the Catalan Tax Agency, 5.92% of 2011 wealth taxpayers (7.70% for those in
the top 50%) made a gift between 2008 and 2011, when the wealth tax was not in
force. This share rose to 9.98% (14.26% for top 50%) for gifts made between 2012
and 2015.
These are, nevertheless, merely descriptive facts. In the following sections we
consider the tax planning strategies explained above and examine the effect of
wealth taxes on wealth accumulation, on asset portfolio, on the probability of
making a gift, on taxable income and on other relevant outcomes.
4 Methodology
4.1 Measuring the impact of the reintroduction of the wealth
tax
As discussed, the objective of this paper is to study how taxpayers responded to
the reintroduction of the wealth tax in terms of wealth accumulation, wealth com-
position and other outcomes we describe below. The ideal setting to carry out this
study would be that in which it was possible to compare - before and after the
reform - wealth taxpayers to similar individuals not subject to the tax. However,
this ideal control group does not exist. Therefore, instead, we use as our identifi-
cation strategy the variation in exposure to the treatment (i.e. the reintroduction
of the tax).
Figure 2, panel (a), shows the 2011 average tax rates, defined as the wealth tax
liability over total reported wealth, for different levels of wealth. Additionally,
it shows the highest average tax rate a taxpayer would face for a given level of
wealth, assuming all reported wealth is taxed (i.e. there are no exemptions other
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than the minimum threshold of 700,000 euros that applies to everyone) and the
limit on tax liability is not operative.
Note that for a given level of wealth, some taxpayers face an average tax rate
close (or equal) to the maximum, whereas others face a much lower (or even zero)
average tax rate. In other words, taxpayers with similar levels of wealth were
differently affected by the reintroduction of the wealth tax. This dispersion in
tax rates originates from different sources: differences in taxable wealth due to
main residence and business exemptions and differences in the tax liability when
the limit applies. Using the average tax rate as a measure of exposure to the
treatment allows us to compile all these factors into a single indicator. Figure A1
in Appendix B shows 2011 average tax rates for different types of taxpayer: a)
those for whom only the main-dwelling exemption is applied, if any; b) those who
also report business exemptions (including both listed and unlisted companies);
c) those who qualify for the limit on tax liability and d) those who satisfy both
b) and c). Most of the variation in the tax rates originated from situations b),
c) and d), given that the main-dwelling exemption is bounded up to 300,000 euros.
Figure 2, panel (b), shows an estimation of the average tax rates that taxpayers
would have faced in 2011 if the wealth tax changes approved in 2012 had been
applied in the previous year. The picture does not change greatly from panel (a).
This is the case because, again, tax changes would differently affect taxpayers with
similar levels of wealth due to the existence of wealth tax exemptions and the limit
on wealth tax liability. Therefore, both indicators (real and estimated average tax
rates) provide very similar measures of taxpayers’ exposure to the wealth tax.
Most of the literature uses marginal tax rates to analyse responses to tax rate
increases (or decreases)49, usually in the last tax bracket. However, it is not
the aim of this paper to study responses to a tax change but rather to a tax
(re)introduction. It seeks as such to examine how exposure to this reform affected
the evolution of wealth and its components. In this context, we believe marginal
tax rates to be a poorer measure of treatment intensity, especially for the wealth-
iest. This is the case because tax brackets are wide50 and, thus, taxpayers with
different tax liabilities may face the same marginal tax rate. Therefore, for the case
under study we consider it more appropriate to use average rather than marginal
tax rates as our explanatory variable.51
Returning to Figure 2, it is evident that the variation in tax rates increases with
wealth and that it is quite low for the bottom 50% of the observed wealth dis-
tribution. Precisely because our identification strategy relies on the variation in
treatment exposure, henceforth we focus our analysis on the top 50% of the ob-
49See, for instance, Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012) for a review on the elasticity of taxable
income.
50Table A2 in Appendix C shows the statutory tax rates in Catalonia for 2011.
51An alternative explanatory variable could be an average tax rate expressed in terms of
income rather than wealth. However, we believe the average tax rate expressed over wealth to be
more accurate. Some taxpayers in our data misreport information on income and, additionally,
wealth is a stock whereas income is a flow, which is more likely to fluctuate and, so, provide a
distorted indicator.
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served wealth distribution. In fact, according to the figures provided in Table 2,
the bottom 50% only accounts for a small part of the 2011 collected wealth tax
revenues, so the potential responses we fail to estimate should have little impact
in terms of revenues.
Using the 2011 average tax rates as our explanatory variable has, therefore, the
advantage of providing an accurate indicator of the treatment exposure, but it also
has a drawback: it depends on taxpayers’ 2011 wealth, income and asset portfolio.
To deal with this issue, we control non-parametrically for taxpayers’ 2011 wealth,
income, asset portfolio, age and other characteristics that might influence our
dependent variables (see the following section for further details).
4.2 Measuring behavioural responses to the reintroduction
of the wealth tax
Unfortunately, we have no information on taxpayers’ wealth for the period when
the wealth tax was not in force, as it was simply not being collected. However,
taking into account the largely unexpected and belated reintroduction of the tax
in Catalonia (see Section 2.1), we argue that 2011 can serve as a control year.
This assumption is further reinforced by the fact that wealth is a stock, which is
not easily adjusted instantaneously, and in any case, such adjustments are costly.
The initial short-term duration of the measure (just 2 years) increased these ad-
justment costs. Moreover, as discussed in Section 2, the assessment rules do not
always coincide with the market value, but depend on specific criteria, a situation
that complicates the asset valuation adjustment. For instance, wealth deposited
in bank accounts is valued at the highest of the 4th quarter average balance or
the balance at December 31. For quoted shares and quoted bonds, the 4th term
average value is also used. Banks and investment entities do not provide their
customers with all this information until the first quarter of the following year
when they have to file their income and wealth tax returns. Unlisted companies
are assessed according to the book value obtained from their last audited balance
sheet, i.e. 2010 balance sheets for the 2011 wealth tax returns. In the case of real
estate, this is not assessed according to its market price either, but by the highest
between its administrative and acquisition values.
The tax administration does not automatically receive information on wealth ex-
cept for real estate values. However, it does automatically receive information on
capital income, which can be easily related to wealth. In this sense, it is difficult
for taxpayers to hide wealth that generates income directly reported to the tax
administration. The situation is obviously different for unproductive assets, such
as antiques or jewellery, and indeed very few tax filers report wealth of this kind.
In any case, according to survey evidence, this wealth represents a very small frac-
tion of taxpayers’ total worth.52
52According to the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (wave 2011), jewellery, works of art
and antiques represent around 0.9% of net wealth for the last decile of the wealth distribution,
i.e. the one most comparable to the taxpayers under study here.
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While we cannot directly test the assumption that taxpayers were largely unable
to react to the reintroduction of the wealth tax in 2011, we can inspect related
indicators such as gifts. This is a rapid and effective manner of reducing wealth.
Thus, if taxpayers had made a concerted effort to rapidly reduce their wealth at
the end of 2011, we should observe a spike in the number of gifts declared during
that period. However, gifts data suggest this not to be the case. Figure A2 in
Appendix B shows the frequency of gifts declared in Catalonia during the last 8
weeks of every year between 2009 and 2014. Gifts declared during the last 8 weeks
of year 2011 are no higher than in previous years, when the wealth tax was not in
force.
In any case, we do not need a complete lack of response in 2011 for our identifica-
tion strategy. What we, in fact, require is that, after controlling for 2011 reported
wealth, income, asset portfolio, age and other personal characteristics (see below),
taxpayers are comparable and would behave in the same way in the absence of
the wealth tax. This requires a similar reporting (and under-reporting) behaviour
among similar taxpayers based on their 2011 tax returns. In the case of significant
under-reporting behaviour in 2011 due to the reintroduction of the wealth tax
(which we consider implausible for the reasons outlined above)53, the responses we
estimate would be a lower bound.




αy · Yy=t · atr11i + γt + δi +
∑
y 6=2011
λy · Yy=t ·X11i + νi,t (1)
where Dep.vari,t are the different dependent variables that we explain below, Yy=t
is a year dummy that takes a value of 1 when the year equals t, atr11i is 2011
average tax rates, αy is our parameter of interest
54, γt captures year fixed effects,
δi is an individual fixed effect and X
11
i is a set of non-parametric controls detailed
below and based on the reference year, 2011. In the case of atr11i , we use both the
real and the “estimated” 2011 average tax rates shown in Figure 2.
The dependent variables we examine are: log of taxable wealth, log of total re-
ported wealth, log of taxable income, the probability of making (and declaring) a
gift55, the probability of facing the limit on tax liability56, the share of long-term
capital gains over taxable income, the share of exempt assets over total reported as-
sets and different components of taxpayers’ asset portfolio; specifically, the share
of (i) real estate; (ii) business assets and unlisted companies; (iii) listed equity
and investment funds; and (iv) bank accounts and bonds, distinguishing between
exempt and taxable assets. Indeed, we are interested in the evolution of these
variables with respect to the base year; hence, the estimates are normalized to
zero in 2011. Given that the type and magnitude of the responses might vary
53Here, we do not consider offshore evaded wealth, which would not have been reported either
in the absence of the wealth tax due to the existence of income taxes.
54We later relate this coefficient with elasticities with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return.
55We define a dummy which takes a value of 1 if a taxpayer makes a gift in year t (and it is
reported to the Catalan tax authorities), and 0 otherwise.
56We define a dummy which takes a value of 1 if a taxpayer faces the limit on tax liability in
year t, and 0 otherwise.
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depending on the initial wealth composition, we examine heterogeneous effects ac-
cording to the relative importance of unlisted companies and business assets over
total reported assets in 2011.
We also show the estimation results from specification (1) without including the
set of non-parametric controls X11i interacted with year dummies Yy=t. To be able
to talk about causal effects, the underlying assumption behind this specification
would require that wealth components evolved in the same way for all taxpayers
in the absence of the wealth tax, once time and individual fixed effects have been
taken into consideration. However, we consider this a strong assumption to make,
especially because we cannot test it, given the absence of data for the period when
the wealth tax was not in force. For this reason, we include the control variables
defined below.
To capture non-tax trends driven by changes in asset prices and asset-specific re-
turns57, we create deciles of the following asset shares: i) housing; ii) listed equity
and investment funds; iii) unlisted companies and business assets; and iv) bank
accounts and bonds. Since we only have information on overall taxable income,
but not on capital income specifically, we control both for taxable income58 and
wealth deciles to further address differences in returns, given that there is evidence
of a positive correlation between returns and the level of wealth (Fagereng et al.,
2018). Additionally, controlling for income and wealth levels avoids mean reversion
issues. To deal with differences in saving rates and attitudes towards inheritance
and gift tax we control for age groups with the following cut-offs: 45, 65 and 75
years.59 To further control for differences in saving rates we also include deciles of
the share of debt over total assets. All these control variables are defined accord-
ing to the information reported in 2011 wealth tax returns and interacted with
year dummies Yy=t. Finally, as the tax amnesty mentioned in Section 3 took place
during the period under study, this might have affected the reporting behaviour
from 2012 onwards. Thus, we also include a dummy indicating tax amnesty par-
ticipation interacted with year dummies.60 For reference purposes, we define this
set of controls as “decile controls”.
Constrained by the fact that we cannot test the parallel trends assumption, we
also use an alternative set of non-parametric controls including the same variables
detailed above, but defined more narrowly to dissipate the correlation between
2011 average tax rates and 2011 taxpayers’ wealth, income and asset portfolio. In
57Considering the specific assessment rules provided in the Wealth Tax Law, changes in asset
prices might not necessarily be reflected in tax returns (for instance, those related to real estate).
However, changes in asset returns might affect taxpayers’ investment and saving behaviour.
58We define an extra category for those taxpayers who do not report information on income
(representing 10% of the observations used in the main estimations). We also checked that our
results do not substantially change when excluding these observations.
59We define an extra category for those taxpayers whose age is non-available (representing
just 0.06% of the observations used in the main estimations).
60We do not know exactly whether a taxpayer participated in the tax amnesty or not, but
we can identify those taxpayers who submitted a supplementary 2011 wealth tax form when
the tax amnesty took place (October-November 2012). Therefore, we consider as tax amnesty
participants those taxpayers who filed an additional 2011 wealth tax form during, or later than,
October 2012.
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particular, wealth and income are ranked every 5 and 4 percentiles, respectively.
Asset shares are ranked every 2.5 percentage points, with the exception of housing
shares, which are ranked every 2 percentage points. The remaining variables have
the same definition as above. Again, all the control variables are defined according
to the information reported in the 2011 wealth tax returns and interacted with
year dummies Yy=t. For reference purposes, we define this set of controls as “nar-
row controls”.
Table A1 in Appendix C shows the relation between 2011 average tax rates and
2011 taxpayers’ wealth, income and asset portfolio when no controls are included
and when “decile” and “narrow” controls are considered.
In summary, for each dependent variable we show three different estimates:
a- Those obtained when controlling only for time and individual fixed effects.
b- Those obtained when using the “decile controls” as X11i .
c- Those obtained when using the “narrow controls” as X11i .
Next, we need to address the potential mechanical effect of wealth taxes. If wealth
taxes are paid out of savings, then they mechanically reduce wealth, even in the
absence of behavioural responses. In order to account for this potential mechan-
ical effect, we adjust yearly reported wealth and taxable wealth with the wealth
tax liabilities paid up to that date by applying a 3% net rate of return.6162 The
mechanical effect, however, would not be present if wealth taxes were paid through
consumption, substituting other expenditures for such payments. Since we have
no information to test these hypotheses, our results for taxable and total re-
ported wealth are presented both omitting and adjusting for the mechanical effect.
Results concerning wealth composition, though, only provide overall effects (be-
havioural+mechanical, if any), since we would need to make strong assumptions
about the specific assets used to pay wealth taxes to adjust for the mechanical
effect.
4.3 Further discussion of the identification assumptions
We would like to make clear where the variation in average tax rates comes from,
after including the set of non-parametric controls. The answer is from the exemp-
tions and the limit on tax liability. Thus, while we control for the overall housing,
listed equities and unlisted companies share, the specific importance of the ex-
emptions within these shares varies across taxpayers. For instance, imagine two
identical taxpayers with just one difference: taxpayer Z owns 4% of two different
61Assuming that wealth taxes are paid out of financial assets, we compute an average gross
rate of return to financial assets using the 2011 Survey of Household Finances microdata. This
average is 4% for households whose net wealth is above 1.5M euros (this is the lowest net wealth
value in our estimation sample). In turn, we compute the net rate of return applying capital
income tax rates (25% for years 2012-2014 and 21.5% for 2015).
62For instance, 2012 reported wealth is adjusted with (2011 wealth tax liability)*1.03. Suc-
cessively, 2013 reported wealth will be adjusted with (2011 wealth tax liability)*1.032 and (2012
wealth tax liability)*1.03, and so on.
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unlisted companies and taxpayer S owns 6% and 2%, respectively. The overall
value of these assets is worth the same for both taxpayers; nevertheless, taxpayer
S can exempt part of these shares from the wealth tax whereas taxpayer Z cannot,
as his ownership share is below 5%63. Suppose now two other identical taxpayers
with just one difference: taxpayer X owns a very expensive main dwelling, while
taxpayer Y owns a small main dwelling and a second residence. The overall value
of these assets is worth the same for both taxpayers. However, taxpayer X will
face a lower average tax rate than taxpayer Y, given that only main-dwellings are
exempt from the tax, up to 300,000 euros. Because of the existence of this limit,
the variation originating from the main-dwelling exemption is also limited. The
last source of variation comes from the importance of long-term capital gains in
taxable income. To illustrate this, imagine two identical taxpayers who sell the
same shares, obtaining the same capital gain. However, one of them purchased
the shares 2 months earlier than the other and so the gains qualify as long-term,
whereas the others do not. The first taxpayer faces the limit on tax liability; the
second does not. Table 4 shows the relation between 2011 average tax rates and
each particular source of variation, once controlling for the “narrow” set of non-
parametric variables.
The underlying assumption behind these examples and the specification employed
is that, once controlling for time and individual fixed effects and the set of controls
detailed above, the specific importance of the exemptions and long-term capital
gains would not affect the evolution of reported wealth and its components in the
absence of the wealth tax. Unfortunately, we cannot demonstrate this, because,
again, there are no data for the period when the wealth tax was not in force, but
below we provide some arguments that should help to validate this assumption.
First, the exemption status for companies, both listed and unlisted, and for busi-
ness assets is simply a legal definition included in the Wealth Tax Law. The
conditions required by the Law to apply this exemption do not depend on a firm’s
characteristics or outputs, such as number of employees, sales volume, productivity
indices, profits, etc., but rather on ownership share.64 Moreover, there is no public
register or list of companies potentially exempt from the wealth tax, so there is no
way for them to be readily identified. Indeed, precisely because exemption status
depends on ownership share, the same company might be exempt for one taxpayer
and non-exempt for another. It is the individual taxpayer that is able to accredit
their exemption with regard to their own shares, not the company itself. Finally,
the definition of exemption included in the Wealth Tax Law is not used in any
other domain, except that of the inheritance tax. Close heirs who inherit company
shares that may be exempt from the wealth tax can apply a tax deduction on
the inheritance tax. Therefore, besides the wealth tax, this exemption could be
important for old wealth taxpayers. Given that we control for taxpayers’ age this
should not be an issue. Moreover, the Catalan government practically eliminated
the inheritance tax for close inheritors in June 201165, a fact that virtually eradi-
63A minimum 5% ownership share is one of the requirements to exempt business assets and
holdings from the wealth tax. For further information, see Appendix A.
64The Law also requires that at least one member of the family group performs remunerated
management functions within the firm. See Appendix A for more details.
65The Catalan government introduced a 99% tax discount for close inheritors and, conse-
18
cates the importance of this deduction.
In the case of the main-residence exemption, it is difficult to see why the relative
importance of the value of this asset in relation to that of other residences should
affect the evolution of reported wealth and its components, once housing shares,
income and the set of controls described above have been taken into account. In
relation to long-term capital gains, they are taxed at the same rates as financial
capital income in personal income tax; thus, a priori there is no clear tax incentive,
besides that of the wealth tax, to prioritize long-term capital gains realizations over
other sources of capital income.
Finally, we should stress that we are focusing on the evolution of 2011 reported
wealth and its components. It lies beyond the scope of this paper to talk about
evaded wealth. As explained at the beginning of this section, we do not need
to assume that there is no evaded wealth for our identification strategy to hold.
This strategy relies on the comparability of taxpayers according to the information
reported in the 2011 wealth tax returns, meaning it assumes that their reported
wealth, income and asset portfolio would evolve similarly in the absence of the
wealth tax, conditional on the set of control variables and fixed effects already
explained. In turn, this assumption implies that the presence of evaded wealth
should not affect differently the evolution of the reported variables during the
period under analysis, once all the controls and fixed effects are taken into account.
Evaded wealth should be related in the main to unproductive assets, such as
jewellery or antiques, and to offshore accounts. The former do not generate returns
and, as we have seen, represent a very low fraction of individuals’ wealth, so they
should not be an issue for our identification strategy. In the case of offshore
accounts, it is difficult to identify a channel via which wealth held in tax havens
could affect the evolution of reported assets, besides taxpayers’ attitudes towards
risk and other “evader” characteristics, which would be captured by individual
fixed effects, or global economic circumstances, captured by year fixed effects.
4.4 Extensions and general methodological comments
Finally, we check whether treatment exposure is related to the probability of dis-
appearing from the sample. To do this, we implement the following specification:
Disappeari = γ + α · atr11i + λ ·X11i + νi (2)
where Disappeari is a dummy which takes a value of 1 if a taxpayer who submit-
ted a 2011 tax return subsequently disappears from the sample for reasons other
than death. Alternatively, it takes a value of 0 for taxpayers who filed wealth tax
returns every year between 2011 and 2015. The explanatory variable, atr11i , is
the 2011 average tax rate, α is our parameter of interest and X11i is a set of non-
parametric variables which include the “decile” or “narrow” controls defined above
and two additional dummies which identify married tax filers and those who live
in the province of Barcelona.66 In contrast to specification (1), we are not able to
capture unobserved individual characteristics; hence, the estimation results from
quently, tax rates ranged between 0.07 and 0.32%.
66These two additional dummies are captured by individual fixed effects in specification (1).
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(2) need to be treated with caution.
Before moving to the results, some additional methodological comments need to
be made. First, all monetary values are expressed in 2011 euros and, second,
standard errors are clustered by the married taxpayers identified in the sample.
This is the case when they submit income tax returns jointly; however, they have
to submit their wealth tax returns individually so as to report their own wealth.
Finally, to deal with outliers, taxpayers placed in the top 0.5% of reported wealth
and taxable income distributions are not considered in the estimations.
5 Results
5.1 Main estimations
Figures 3-11 show the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals resulting
from specification (1) for the multiple outcomes previously specified. Each figure
provides three different sets of estimates: a) those obtained when controlling only
for time and individual fixed effects (controls -a-); b) those obtained using the
“decile controls” as X11i (controls -b-); and c) those obtained using the “narrow
controls” as X11i (controls -c-). Estimations have been carried out using both the
real and the “estimated” 2011 average tax rates as the explanatory variable; how-
ever, as they give very similar results, we only discuss the estimates obtained with
the real average tax rates. Results obtained with the “estimated” average tax rates
are provided in Appendix D.
In the case of the coefficient estimates from year 2013 onwards, we are unable
to disentangle which part of the response can be attributed to the wealth tax
reintroduction per se and which to the tax increase approved at the very end of
2012.67 In any case, we are interested in the overall responses, even if the tax was
implemented in two different steps.
5.1.1 Taxable and reported wealth responses
Figure 3 shows the coefficient estimates from specification (1) when considering
taxable wealth. The panel to the left shows overall effects (behavioural+mechanical,
if any), while the panel to the right shows behavioural effects, since taxable wealth
has been adjusted for the mechanical effect, assuming in this case that wealth
taxes are paid out of savings. The estimates obtained are very similar when using
“controls -b-” and “controls -c-”, which is also the case for most of the outcomes
studied. Thus, the small differences in 2011 levels when using the set of “decile”
controls do not seem to matter when accounting for the trends. The estimates
obtained when controlling only for individual and time fixed effects, controls -a-,
67The coefficient estimates for 2012 can be fully associated to a response to the
wealth tax reintroduction. The 2012 wealth tax increase was passed on Decem-




are smaller (in absolute values), but follow a similar pattern.
The “control -c-” estimates, resulting from our preferred specification, reflect a neg-
ative effect of treatment exposure on taxable wealth accumulation. The response
is already statistically significantly different from zero in 2012 and accumulates
over time. The coefficient estimate associated with year 2012 suggests that as the
2011 average tax rate increases by 1 percentage point, taxable wealth lowers by
15.34%. This decrease accumulates to as much as 32.44% over 4 years. If we adjust
taxable wealth with the (assumed) mechanical effect, the 2015 coefficient becomes
-29.08%, suggesting that the behavioural (mechanical) effect accounts for 89.65%
(10.35%) of the overall effect.
To interpret the coefficients, note that a 1 percentage point increase in the average
tax rates represents a large experiment: applying it to the mean of 2011 average
tax rates for the estimation sample, which is 0.30%, it would represent a tax in-
crease of 333.33%. For this reason, from now on we refer to the estimates in terms
of a 0.1 percentage point increase.68
The coefficients obtained are within the range reported in the extant literature on
wealth taxes. Among the studies that employ similar methodologies to the one
used here, the lowest estimate is reported by Zoutman (2018), who finds that a
0.1 percentage point change in the wealth tax reduces accumulated taxable wealth
by 1.16% in the short-run (over 2 years) and 1.38% in the long-run (over 5 years).
These estimates rise to 1.3 and 1.67%, respectively, when the author looks at house-
holds above the 75th wealth percentile, a sample that might be more comparable
to ours. Yet, our equivalent short-run estimate (-2.25%) is still higher. Jacobsen
et al. (2019) report an increase of taxable wealth of about 30% over 8 years for
the top 1% of the wealth distribution, in response to an average tax cut of 1.56
percentage points. This estimate is almost 20% in the 4th year after the reform,
which is also lower than our 4th-year coefficient. Using cross-canton data Brülhart
et al. (2017) estimate that a 0.1 percentage-point rise in wealth taxes lowers re-
ported wealth by 3.5% in aggregate. When using micro data for the Canton of
Bern, they find that a 0.1 percentage point increase in wealth taxes reduces wealth
accumulation by 2.3% over a 3-year period. This second magnitude is very close
to our 3rd-year estimate of 2.86%. The studies employing bunching techniques -
that is, Seim (2017) and Londoño Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha (2019) - report much
lower estimates: a decrease in taxable wealth of 0.027% and 0.2%, respectively,
if we interpret the coefficients in terms of a 0.1 percentage point increase in the
wealth tax rates.69
Following the reasoning of Brülhart et al. (2017), we next express our coefficient
68This is also the approach followed by Brülhart et al. (2017) and Zoutman (2018).
69The estimates in Seim (2017) and Londoño Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha (2019) are not directly
comparable because they account for the elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the net-of-
wealth tax rate. Nevertheless, taking into account that wealth tax rates are low (1.5% in Seim
2017 and 1% for the first 2010 tax bracket in Londoño Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha 2019), we can
use the property of logarithms: log(1 + x) ≈ x, for small x, to express the estimates in terms of
a 0.1 percentage point change in the wealth tax rates. Considering the upper-bound estimates
in both cases, the comparable coefficients are -0.027 and -0.2, respectively.
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estimates in terms of the implied net-of-tax rate on the annual returns to wealth.
The mean of the average income (wealth) tax rates in 2011 is 24% (0.30%) for the
estimation sample. Considering a gross rate of return to net wealth of 3%, com-
puted from the 2011 Spanish Survey of Household Finances microdata70, the mean
average wealth tax rate corresponds to a 10% tax on capital return. Hence, the
net-of-tax rate, considering both income and wealth taxes, is 1-(0.24+0.10)=66%.
A 0.1 percentage point increase in the wealth tax represents a 3.33 percentage
point increase in the tax on capital return, which leads to a net-of-tax rate of
1-(0.24+0.1333)=62.67%. Thus, a 0.1 percentage point increase in the wealth tax,
which translates to a reduction of 5.05% in the net-of-tax rate, lowers accumulated
taxable wealth by 3.24% over 4 years. Therefore, the elasticity of taxable wealth
with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return is 3.24%/5.05%=0.64. Comparable
estimates from other studies in the wealth taxation literature take values of 0.85
in Brülhart et al. (2017), 0.5 in Jacobsen et al. (2019)71 and 0.08 in Londoño Vélez
and Ávila-Mahecha (2019). Nevertheless, it should be noted that these estimates
are sensitive to the assumed rate of return, as shown in Brülhart et al. (2017).
Figure 4 shows the coefficient estimates from specification (1) when considering
total reported wealth. As in Figure 3, the panel to the left shows overall effects
(behavioural+mechanical, if any), while the panel to the right shows behavioural
effects, assuming the mechanical effect takes place. Interestingly, wealth taxes do
not have a negative effect on wealth accumulation. Estimates from the left-hand
panel suggest that wealth taxes do not have a significant impact on the evolution
of total reported wealth. If we assume wealth taxes are paid out of savings (thus,
mechanically reducing wealth), when we account for this effect in the right-hand
panel, the estimates indicate that the taxpayers that are most exposed to the rein-
troduction of the tax increase their savings in the subsequent years. Specifically,
as the 2011 average tax rate increases by 0.1 percentage point, reported wealth
increases by 0.5% over a 4-year period. If we translate this estimate into an elas-
ticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return following the same procedure
as described above, it takes a value of -0.1. There could be several explanations
for this: i) taxpayers derive some utility from wealth per se, also known as “capi-
talistic spirit” motive (see Kopczuk, 2010; Saez and Stantcheva, 2018) and, hence,
they increase their savings to offset the mechanical effect of wealth taxes; and ii)
taxpayers make use of tax avoidance strategies and defer the realization of capital
income to take advantage of the limit on tax liability. The following sections seek
to shed further light on this.
5.1.2 Avoidance responses
Figure 5 shows the coefficient estimates from specification (1) when considering
potential tax avoidance strategies derived from the design of the wealth tax. As ex-
plained in Section 2.2, these strategies are related to the use of the limit on wealth
70We compute an average gross rate of return to net wealth using the 2011 Survey of Household
Finances microdata. This average is 3% for households whose net wealth is above 1.5M euros
(this is the lowest net wealth value in our estimation sample).
71Elasticity computed for the top 1% of the wealth distribution over an 8-year period. The
change in the net-of-tax rate of return is 61% and the accumulated effect on taxable wealth is
about 30%.
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tax liability and exempt assets. The left-hand panel shows a positive relationship
between exposure to the reintroduced tax and the probability of facing the limit
on wealth tax liability in subsequent years. Taxpayers respond quickly, since most
of the effect has already taken place in 2012. This suggests that taxpayers take
advantage of this tax feature every year and not on just one occasion. The 2012
coefficient indicates that the probability of facing the limit in 2012 increases by
3.69 percentage points as the 2011 average tax rate increases by 0.1 percentage
points. This probability rises by 4.02 percentage points in 2015. This effect rep-
resents 0.28 times the share of taxpayers facing the limit in 2011.
The results in the right-hand panel of Figure 5 are not surprising if we take into
consideration the estimates from Figures 3 and 4. Taxpayers take advantage of
the wealth tax exemptions, which is why taxable wealth can fall without reducing
total reported wealth. The 2015 coefficient indicates that a 0.1 percentage point
increase in the 2011 average tax rate leads to a 1.81 percentage points rise in the
share of exempt assets over a 4-year period. Put differently, the differences in the
share of exempt assets existing in 2011 (see Table 4) are reduced by one quarter
after 4 years.
As discussed in Section 2.2, there are two procedures that can help a taxpayer
benefit from the limit on wealth tax liability: reducing their realized taxable in-
come and increasing the importance of their realized long-term capital gains in
taxable income. Figure 6 shows that taxpayers, in fact, employ both strategies.
Estimates from the left-hand panel indicate that a 0.1 percentage point increase
in the 2011 average tax rate leads to a reduction in taxable income of 1.98% over 4
years. This coefficient takes a value of (1.98%/5.05%)=0.39 when expressed as an
elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return.72 This
apparently large effect is less important when we consider its potential impact on
wealth accumulation. Indeed, the 4-year average decrease in taxable income of
almost 8,000 euros73 only represents 0.20% of the 2011 average reported wealth.
Furthermore, this effect on taxable income does not necessarily imply a reduction
in savings, since it could also be explained by an increase in unrealized capital
income. If part of the foregone income is capitalized, then it should not impact
wealth accumulation. It is not unreasonable to believe this to be the case, given
that, as we see below, the taxpayers that are most exposed to the wealth tax in-
crease their preference for assets that allow them to produce capital income in the
form of capital gains easily. However, we have no further information on income
sources to confirm this.
Apart from lowering taxable income, the importance of realized long-term capital
gains increases over time. The different evolution of both effects is not surpris-
ing, given that capital gains realization is much easier to adjust than other income
sources. Indeed, the 2012 response in the share of long-term capital gains accounts
for half of the 4-year effect, which explains the sharp rise in the probability of fac-
72This estimate is not very different from the 0.278 capital income elasticity reported by
Kleven and Schultz (2014).
73Considering the mean 2011 average tax rate of 0.30% and the 2011 average income of 134,277
euros.
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ing the limit on tax liability shown in Figure 5. Moreover, the 2012 coefficient
also tells us that in just one year taxpayers have almost reversed the differences
in the share of long-term capital gains existing in 2011 (shown in Table 4). The
estimated effect keeps rising up to a coefficient of 0.98 percentage points for 2015,
which represents 0.23 times the average share of long-term capital gains in 2011.
Figures 7 to 10 show the responses of the taxpayers’ asset portfolios to the rein-
troduction of the wealth tax. The left-hand panel in Figure 7 shows that, overall,
there are no significant effects of wealth taxes on the share of housing. Yet, the
right-hand panel estimates suggest that higher tax rates do seem to boost the use
of the main-dwelling exemption, although the effect is quite small. The 4-year
estimate takes a value of 0.06 percentage points, which represents 1.2% of the av-
erage share of exempt housing in 2011. Furthermore, this coefficient tells us that
the differences in the share of exempt housing existing in 2011 (see Table 4) are
reduced by 12.78% after 4 years.
The left-hand panel in Figure 8 indicates that facing higher wealth taxes has a neg-
ative effect on the overall importance of unlisted companies and business assets.
This negative effect derives from taxable assets (middle panel), which are partly
shifted to exempt assets (right-hand panel). The last coefficient tells us that a
0.1 percentage point increase in 2011 average tax rates leads to a rise in the share
of exempt businesses of 0.96 percentage points over 4 years. This effect reduces
the 2011 differences in the share of exempt businesses by 18.74%. The equivalent
4-year effect on taxable businesses is more than 2 times higher, with the opposite
sign, which reflects a shift in preferences towards other types of asset. Estimates
from Figure 9 confirm this is indeed the case. Facing higher wealth tax rates leads
taxpayers to switch their holdings in unlisted companies and business assets to
listed equity and investment funds. This response is not surprising when consid-
ering the tax liability limit. These latter assets allow taxpayers to realize capital
gains much more easily than is the case with unlisted companies, and, moreover,
it helps them reduce their annual capital income, especially the assets that do not
produce realized income until they are sold. The results shown in Figure 6 are
very much in line with this reasoning.
The 4th-year coefficient in the left-hand panel of Figure 9 indicates that a 0.1
percentage point increase in the 2011 average tax rate leads to a rise in the overall
share of listed equity and investment funds of 1.15 percentage points. According
to the last estimate in the right-hand panel, 70% of this effect comes from exempt
assets.74 This is a large response considering that the average share of exempt
listed equity in 2011 was 1.58%. Put differently, this effect reduces the 2011 dif-
ferences in the share of exempt listed companies by 46.5%.
To conclude this analysis of asset portfolio responses, Figure 10 shows very small
effects on bank accounts and bonds (the 4th-year coefficient takes a value of -0.14
percentage points). This negative coefficient could reflect a potential mechanical
74Holdings in listed companies may also be exempt from the wealth tax if the ownership share
is at least 5% and other conditions specified in the Law are satisfied. See Appendix A for further
information.
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effect derived from wealth tax payments. Unfortunately, we have no further infor-
mation to examine this question in greater depth.
Finally, Figure 11 shows the effect of facing higher tax rates on the probability of
making a gift (as declared to the Catalan Tax Agency) in the subsequent years.
The positive effect recorded in 2012 and 2013 disappears thereafter. The 2013
coefficient indicates that a 0.1 percentage point increase in the 2011 average tax
rate leads to a rise in the probability of making a gift in 2013 of 0.27 percentage
points. This effect represents 0.14 times the share of taxpayers who made a gift in
2011. The fact that this response does not persist over time, contrary to the other
trends described up to this juncture, suggests that taxpayers prefer tax avoidance
strategies that do not imply giving up wealth. This would point to a “capitalistic
motive” underlying wealth accumulation, but it may also be driven by the fact that
gifts are subject to gift taxes and the other avoidance strategies are less costly, at
least in taxation terms.
5.2 Heterogeneous effects
Below we seek to verify whether the responses described above vary according to
the initial circumstances of the taxpayers in our sample. If taxpayer responses are,
indeed, driven by tax avoidance strategies, we would expect those already owning
a business in 2011 to make greater use of the business exemption and those who
did not to take advantage of the tax liability limit. This hypothesis is based on
the fact that, for non-business owners, changing their entire wealth structure to
set up a company for reasons of tax exemption is costly, especially if we consider
the high degree of uncertainty regarding the tax’s continuity.
To determine whether this was the case, we divide the estimation sample in
two groups: those whose 2011 share of unlisted companies and business assets
was below the median (“Business-Low”) and those whose 2011 share was above
(“Business-High”). The median takes a value of 19.45%. Figure A3 shows the 2011
average asset portfolio for each group. Histograms from Figure A4 in Appendix B
show that, not surprisingly, “Business-High” taxpayers are younger (panel b) and
overall earn higher taxable income (panel a).
Figures 12 to 20 show the coefficient estimates resulting from specification (1) for
each of the two groups when using the set of “narrow” control variables. The
outcomes analysed do not change from those already described. For purposes of
comparison, the figures also include the coefficients derived from the main esti-
mations previously shown (labelled “All”). In line with the hypothesis forwarded
above, the results reflect a clear distinction in the strategies adopted by the two
groups in response to the reintroduction of the tax (see, for instance, Figure 14).
The only two outcomes for which the responses were the same are bank accounts
and bonds share (Figure 19) and gifts (Figure 20).
Taxable wealth was reduced significantly more by “Business-High” taxpayers (Fig-
ure 12), in favour of exempt assets (right-hand panel in Figure 14). Figure 17 shows
that facing higher tax rates in 2011 led “Business-High” taxpayers to rearrange
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their business assets and shares so that they were exempt from the tax. Accord-
ing to Figure 14, some of them also sought to benefit from the tax liability limit,
presumably those who earned lower incomes, since the responses in the case of tax-
able income are not statistically significantly different from zero for this taxpayer
group, whereas the importance of long-term capital gains increased slightly (Fig-
ure 15). Considering the little importance attached to listed equity and investment
funds for this taxpayer group in 2011 (Figure A3), the switch towards this type of
asset reflected in Figure 18 is likely to explain the effect on long-term capital gains.
If we focus on “Business-Low” taxpayers, Figure 14 shows that they clearly took
advantage of the limit on tax liability. Facing higher tax rates in 2011 led “Business-
Low” taxpayers to significantly reduce their taxable income and to increase their
share of long-term capital gains in the subsequent years (Figure 15). Indeed,
owning a higher share of listed equity and investment funds (Figure A3) makes it
easier to realize long term capital gains. Yet, this group of taxpayers also exploited
wealth exemptions. As shown in Figure 18, the taxpayers most exposed to wealth
taxes in 2011 increased the importance of their share of exempt listed companies
in the subsequent years. This response might have helped them take advantage of
the tax liability limit and, at the same time, allowed them to reduce their taxable
wealth. Additionally, Figure 16 illustrates a clear switch from taxable to exempt
housing. This suggests that taxpayers changed their fiscal residence (though with-
out necessarily changing their actual dwelling) to a property of higher value, to
further exploit the main-dwelling exemption. Nevertheless, this effect is small be-
cause the exemption is limited up to 300,000 euros.
Responses related to taking advantage of the limit on wealth tax liability reflect
only avoidance strategies, since taxpayers exploit the provisions foreseen by the
Law. However, the extent to which the use of the exemptions constitutes tax
avoidance or tax evasion is difficult to define, especially in the case of business
exemptions. According to the Law, this exemption can only be equivalent to that
part which is directly involved in a firm’s economic activity. However, determining
which assets are directly involved in the economic activity is clearly ambiguous as
the law only provides general indications and, thus, ultimately, it is left up to the
criteria of the taxpayers’ themselves. The arbitrary nature of the tax regulations
might in turn result in the potential abuse of this tax incentive. Indeed, Durán-
Cabré et al. (2018), in estimating the tax gap in Catalonia for 2014, find that a
sizable percentage of the tax gap in the wealth tax is attributable to the incorrect
use of the business exemption.
To sum up, our results clearly indicate that taxpayers responded significantly to
the reintroduction of the wealth tax by adopting a range of avoidance (and possibly
also evasive) strategies. Just what the impact of this was in terms of tax revenues
is examined in the following section.
5.3 Impact on tax revenues
As we have seen above, wealth tax rates have a negative effect on taxable wealth,
which necessarily implies a negative effect on tax revenues. Given that wealth tax
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rates changed in 2012, we compute the effect on tax revenues based on an estimate
of 2011 wealth tax revenues assuming that the new tax rates were already in place.
By so doing, we ensure we only capture behavioural responses.
Considering the 0.3% mean for the 2011 average tax rates and the “control-c-”
coefficient estimates from the left-hand panel in Figure 3, the average decrease in
taxable wealth (with respect to 2011) was 4.6% in 2012, 6.76% in 2013, 8.58% in
2014 and 9.73% in 2015. If we combine this with the 2011 average taxable wealth
(2,358,664 euros) and the mean of estimated 2011 average tax rates expressed over
taxable wealth (0.47%), this translates into an average decrease in tax liability of
510 euros in 2012, 750 euros in 2013, 951 euros in 2014 and 1,079 euros in 2015.
If we express the aggregate effect of 17,853 taxpayers in terms of 2011 estimated
wealth tax revenues, we obtain the following percentages: -3.42% for 2012, -5.02%
for 2013, -6.38% for 2014 and -7.23% for 2015.
However, this aggregate effect does not account for the revenue loss derived from
the progressivity in the tax schedule, which implies that the remaining taxable
wealth is being taxed at lower average rates. Yet, the effect on tax revenues does
not stop here due to the existence of responses regarding the limit on tax liabil-
ity. Unlike the former, these responses directly affect the tax liability and, so, the
impact on tax revenues might be higher. Consequently, to be able to capture the
overall impact of the different set of responses, we estimate how initial exposure
to the wealth tax explains the taxpayers’ subsequent contributions to wealth tax
revenues, relative to 2011. More specifically, we estimate specification (1) using
as our dependent variable the tax liability of taxpayer i in year t, expressed over
2011 estimated wealth tax revenues. Here again, to exclude the mechanical effect
resulting from 2012 tax changes, the 2011 tax liability is computed as if these tax
changes were already in place.
In the first row of Table 5 we show the coefficient estimates resulting from speci-
fication (1) when using the set of “narrow” controls, and, in the second row, the
aggregate estimates, which are obtained multiplying the former by the 0.3% mean
of the 2011 average tax rates and the number of taxpayers from the estimation
sample (17,853). The aggregate effect reveals a marked impact on wealth tax rev-
enues. If we sum the annual estimates, the accumulated aggregate effect is -2.6.
This number indicates that the tax avoidance strategies adopted by taxpayers be-
tween 2012 and 2015 were far from negligible, since they represent a 4-year revenue
loss of 2.6 times the 2011 estimated wealth tax revenues.
On the other hand, the negative effect of wealth taxes on taxable income has a
collateral negative effect on personal income tax revenues. Taking the coefficient
estimates from the left-hand panel in Figure 6, the average decrease in taxable
income is about 3,800 euros in 2013, 5,000 euros in 2014 and almost 8,000 euros in
2015.75 Applying the 24% mean of 2011 average income tax rates, this translates
into an aggregate effect of -2.45% for 2013, -3.18% for 2014 and -5.09% for 2015,
expressed in terms of the 2011 income tax revenues generated by the estimation
75Considering the mean 2011 average tax rate of 0.30% and the 2011 average income of 134,277
euro.
27
sample. When summing the annual estimates, the accumulated aggregate effect is
-10.72%. Again, these estimates are a lower bound because they do not account
for the revenue loss derived from the progressivity in the tax schedule.
5.4 Initial wealth tax exposure and subsequent tax filing
Finally, Table 6 shows the coefficient estimates resulting from specification (2). As
previously stated, with this specification we are unable to capture unobserved in-
dividual characteristics that might bias the estimates; hence, these results should
be treated with caution. Nevertheless, we believe it is still interesting to know,
especially for auditing purposes, whether there is a positive relation between ex-
posure to the reintroduction of the wealth tax and the probability of disappearing
from the sample in the subsequent years. Estimates suggest this might indeed
be the case. Specifically, as 2011 average tax rates increased by 0.1 percentage
points, the probability of leaving the sample between 2012 and 2015 rose by 0.2
percentage points.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 6 suggest that it is the “Business-High” taxpayers
that are driving this result. A potential explanation could be that taxpayers in
this group are younger (see Figure A4) and, hence, they might be more mobile.
However, we cannot determine whether they moved elsewhere or stopped filing for
other reasons (other than death); thus, further information would be needed to
discover the mechanism responsible for this response.
6 Conclusions
The significant growth in wealth inequality has revived the debate centred on
wealth taxation, both in public policy and in academia. However, as shown above,
little is known about how existing wealth taxes (or those previously imposed) af-
fect taxpayers’ behaviour. This lack of empirical evidence complicates any valid
evaluation of the desirability of such taxes. Against this backdrop, this paper has
examined how Catalan taxpayers reacted to the reintroduction of the Wealth Tax
in 2011. Using the universe of wealth tax returns submitted to the Catalan Tax
Agency between 2011 and 2015, we have exploited the variation in treatment ex-
posure to analyse taxpayers’ responses, not only in terms of wealth accumulation,
but also of their potential avoidance strategies.
The main conclusion to be drawn from the results is that taxpayers responded
significantly to the wealth tax, not in terms of savings, but through the adoption
of avoidance (and possibly also evasive) strategies. Specifically, while facing higher
wealth taxes did not have a negative effect on wealth accumulation, it did encour-
age taxpayers to change their asset and income composition to take advantage
of wealth tax exemptions and the limit set on wealth tax liability. As such, this
paper has documented two different types of response, which are more or less pre-
dominant depending on the initial importance of a taxpayer’s business assets and
shares. The first type of response was precisely to reduce taxable wealth in favour
of exempt assets, mainly in terms of company shares (both listed and unlisted).
This translates into an elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the net-of-tax
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rate of return of 0.64. The second type of response - related to the application of a
tax liability limit and adopted primarily by taxpayers holding few business shares
- involved reducing their realized taxable income and increasing their long-term
capital gains realizations, on the income side, and investing in listed companies
and investment funds, on the asset portfolio side. Clearly, however, these income-
asset portfolio responses were not independent of one another, as the latter helped
achieve the former.
All in all, these avoidance responses are high in terms of foregone tax revenues,
representing a 4-year accumulated revenue loss of 2.6 times the estimated wealth
tax revenues for 2011. Hence, our results indicate that these specific tax features,
initially created to incentivize small- and medium-sized businesses (in the case of
the business exemption) and to prevent a confiscatory tax (in the case of the limit
set on tax liability), actually have quite major perverse effects. The costs to which
they give rise, in terms not only of revenues and tax auditing resources, but also of
equity and efficiency, are scarcely justifiable if they serve as significant channels for
tax avoidance. Moreover, these features severely undermine the redistributive role
of the tax. Thus, all the evidence points to an unequivocal conclusion: the current
Spanish Wealth Tax needs to be redesigned. However, this is not something that
regional governments can do unaided, even though they are responsible for the
administration of the tax; it requires the involvement of the Central government,
which wields most of the legislative capacity with respect to the wealth tax.
A comprehensive tax base including all types of asset, with no differential treat-
ment being applied across taxpayers with the same stock of wealth (as proposed
by Saez and Zucman, 2019), would make the tax more efficient and equitable, as
well as going some way to facilitating the auditing tasks for the tax administration.
This in turn would allow a significant reduction in the current marginal tax rates
without giving up the progressivity of the tax, as long as the minimum threshold
is set high. By way of illustration, if only wealth stocks above 5 million euros were
(fully) taxed - which represents roughly the top 10% of wealth taxpayers in 2011
and around 0.1% of personal income tax filers - a flat tax rate of 0.6% would be
sufficient to collect revenues equivalent to the wealth tax income collected in 2011.
And this flat tax rate is much lower than existing statutory tax rates for these
levels of wealth.
Finally, the external validity of our results might be called into question, given that
they are fully linked to the design of this particular wealth tax and its institutional
context. So, while they can be readily extrapolated to the other Spanish regions
that levy the same wealth tax and share a similar institutional context, they can
hardly be extrapolated to other countries where wealth taxes are (or used to be)
set differently. However, the findings reported here should be useful to policy
makers and administrations thinking of implementing a wealth tax insofar as they
illustrate the pitfalls to be avoided.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics by wealth deciles, 2011
Wealth deciles (%)
Total
0-10 40-50 80-90 90-100
Total reported wealth mean 797,053 1,383,696 3,990,827 14,799,237 3,047,847
std. dev. 383,089 59,185 614,566 26,543,059 9,309,675
Taxable wealth mean 752,735 1,206,829 2,424,218 6,402,095 1,852,263
std. dev. 414,306 170,433 1,406,150 11,493,279 4,007,279
Income mean 48,937 76,164 170,631 453,006 126,333
std. dev. 65,922 126,925 320,785 1,911,277 648,811
WT liability mean 138 1,751 14,606 51,817 8,714
std. dev. 92 780 13,684 129,621 43,920
Average tax rate (%) mean 0.017 0.126 0.364 0.370 0.182
std. dev. 0.011 0.054 0.324 0.399 0.228
Notes: All amounts are expressed in euros, except the average tax rate, which is computed as
the Wealth Tax (WT) liability over total reported wealth and is expressed in percentage points.
Wealth deciles are defined according to total wealth (taxable+exempt) reported in 2011. The
number of observations is 44,236, except for income statistics which is 38,915, given that some
taxpayers do not report this information.
Table 2: Evolution of wealth tax revenues, 2011-2015
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Increase
a.real b.estimate 11b-15 %
[1] Total revenues (in million e) 385 455 397 353 351 367 -19.23
[2] Revenues from taxpayers who submit WT returns every year
Total amount (in million e) 316 374 339 330 334 361 -3.64
Weight over total revenues (%) 82.03 82.28 85.41 93.57 95.22 98.17
[3] Same as [2], top 50% of wealth distribution
Total amount (in million e) 302 343 306 291 291 315 -8.37
Weight over total revenues (%) 78.33 75.50 76.98 82.65 82.91 85.65
Notes: Monetary values are expressed in 2011 prices. Figures provided in row [1] are computed
considering only those tax filers who submitted, at least, the tax return for year 2011. Therefore,
they do not include revenues from taxpayers who started submitting wealth tax (WT) returns
for a later year, since they do not form part of this study. Figures in rows [2] and [3] consider
only those taxpayers who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011 and 2015. To enable
comparability across years, two different indicators are given with respect to 2011 revenues: a)
revenues actually collected and b) an estimation of the revenues that would have been collected
if the tax changes approved in 2012 had already been applied to 2011 wealth.
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Table 3: Evolution of variables of interest, 2011-2015
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Increase
11-15 %
Total reported wealth (in million e) 91,916 91,692 93,754 95,517 97,726 6.32
Exempt wealth
Total reported (in million e) 41,314 42,072 44,062 44,608 46,321 12.12
Weight over taxable wealth (%) 81.65 84.79 88.67 87.63 90.11
Taxpayers reporting exempt assets (%) 92.26 92.79 92.90 92.95 92.97
Quoted shares and investment funds
Total reported (in million e) 13,870 14,860 17,475 20,029 20,869 50.46
Weight over taxable wealth (%) 27.41 29.95 35.17 39.34 40.60
Taxpayers reporting these assets (%) 79.83 82.12 83.28 84.83 86.06
Limit on the wealth tax liability
Revenue loss (in million e) 190 256 282 306 294 54.78
Weight over collected WT revenues (%) 62.89 83.70 96.72 105.13 93.39
Taxpayers facing the limit (%) 14.26 20.88 22.43 25.31 23.73
Notes: Monetary values are expressed in 2011 prices. Figures provided in this table consider only
those taxpayers in the top 50% of the observed wealth distribution who filed wealth tax returns
every year between 2011 and 2015. “Quoted shares and investment funds” include taxable assets
only.
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Table 4: Sources of variation in treatment exposure, 2011
Dep. Var.
Exempt Exempt Exempt Exempt Long term
assets housing listed equity unlisted co. capital gains
All
2011 atr -0.7173*** -0.0412*** -0.1747*** -0.5014*** -0.0644***
(0.0085) (0.0013) (0.0064) (0.0087) (0.0061)
Dep. var. mean 0.301 0.0495 0.0171 0.2344 0.0432
Observations 20,371 20,371 20,371 20,371 18,083
5-year filers
2011 atr -0.7244*** -0.0434*** -0.1731*** -0.5079*** -0.0640***
(0.0089) (0.0015) (0.0070) (0.0093) (0.0066)
Dep. var. mean 0.2907 0.0501 0.0158 0.2248 0.0429
Observations 17,853 17,853 17,853 17,853 16,008
Controls “narrow” “narrow” “narrow” “narrow” “narrow”
Year 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by marriages, in parentheses. Only taxpayers in the
top 50% of the observed 2011 wealth distribution are considered. Top 0.5% of income and wealth
distributions are excluded from the estimations to avoid outliers. All estimates refer to all 2011
taxpayers in the top 50%; 5-year filers estimates refer to those who filed wealth tax returns
every year between 2011 and 2015. The first four dependent variables are expressed in shares
over total assets. The last dependent variable is expressed as the share of long term capital
gains over taxable income. The number of observations in the last column is not as high because
some taxpayers do not report information on income. “Narrow” controls include non-parametric
variables which capture taxpayers’ wealth, income, asset portfolio, age, indebtedness share and
tax amnesty participation. For a detailed definition of these controls see Section 4.2.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
35
Table 5: Impact of taxpayers’ responses on wealth tax revenues
2012 2013 2014 2015
a) Individual effect
2011 atr -0.000086*** -0.000120*** -0.000138*** -0.000139***
(0.000005) (0.000007) (0.000007) (0.000007)
b) Aggregate effect
Deviation from 2011 -0.4585*** -0.6445*** -0.7414*** -0.7454***
estimated revenues (0.0290) (0.0364) (0.0372) (0.0390)
Notes: Row -a- provides coefficient estimates and standard errors, in parentheses, from spec-
ification (1) using the set of control variables -c- and real atr11i as the explanatory variable.
For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The dependent variable is the tax
liability of taxpayer i in year t, expressed over the 2011 estimated wealth tax revenues. The
estimation sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of
wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15 (N: 17,853
taxpayers*5years). Standard errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5% of income and
wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations to avoid outliers.
Row -b- provides the annual aggregate impact of taxpayers’ responses in terms of the estimated
wealth tax revenues for 2011. These estimates are obtained by multiplying coefficients from
row -a- by the mean 2011 atr (0.30%) and the number of taxpayers in the estimation sample.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Table 6: Initial wealth tax exposure and subsequent tax filing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2011 atr 0.0202** 0.0247** -0.0050 0.0236*
(0.0096) (0.0099) (0.0170) (0.0125)
Observations 20,371 20,371 10,186 10,185
Controls Decile Narrow Narrow Narrow
Sample All All Business-Low Business-High
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by marriages, in parentheses. Only taxpayers in
the top 50% of the observed 2011 wealth distribution are considered. Top 0.5% of income
and wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations to avoid outliers. “Decile”
and “Narrow” controls include non-parametric variables which capture taxpayers’ wealth,
income, asset portfolio, age, indebtedness share and tax amnesty participation. For a
detailed definition of these controls see Section 4.2. “Business-Low(High)” taxpayers are
those whose 2011 share of unlisted companies and business assets is below(above) the
median. The dependent variable is a dummy which takes a value of 1 if a taxpayer stops
filing wealth tax returns after 2011 for reasons other than death, and 0 otherwise.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Figure 1: Asset portfolio by wealth deciles, 2011
Notes: Wealth deciles are defined according to total wealth (taxable+exempt) reported in 2011.
The number of observations is 44,236. Real estate includes taxpayers’ main dwelling, which is
exempt from the wealth tax. Quoted shares, unlisted companies and business assets include both
taxable and exempt assets.
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Figure 2: Average tax rates, 2011
(a) Real
(b) Estimated
Notes: All average tax rates are expressed in percentage points and computed over the total
reported wealth for 2011. The percentages next to the vertical dashed lines show the cumulative
distribution of 2011 Catalan wealth taxpayers along total reported wealth.
Notes for panel (a): Maximum average tax rate is computed applying the 2011 statutory tax rates
to the overall stock of reported wealth exceeding the minimum threshold (700,000e), assuming
there are no wealth exemptions and the limit on tax liability does not apply.
Notes for panel (b): The estimated average tax rate is computed replicating the wealth tax
liability calculations specified in the law, using 2011 taxable wealth and income and 2012 tax
rates and minimum threshold. The estimated maximum average tax rate is computed by applying
the tax rates and minimum threshold approved in 2012 to the overall stock of wealth reported
in 2011, assuming there are no wealth exemptions and the limit on tax liability does not apply.
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Figure 3: Effect on taxable wealth
Notes: Both figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with real atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from using
alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects. Controls
-b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively, interacted
with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The estimation
sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported
in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered
by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations
to avoid outliers. The dependent variable is the log of taxable wealth. It is (not) adjusted for
the mechanical effect -ME- in the right (left) panel.
N: 88,325 obs
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Figure 4: Effect on total reported wealth
Notes: Both figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with real atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from using
alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects. Controls
-b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively, interacted
with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The estimation
sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported
in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered
by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations
to avoid outliers. The dependent variable is the log of total reported wealth. It is (not) adjusted
for the mechanical effect -ME- in the right (left) panel.
N: 89,265 obs
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Figure 5: Effect on potential tax avoidance strategies
Notes: Both figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with real atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from using
alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects. Controls
-b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively, interacted
with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The estimation
sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported
in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered
by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations
to avoid outliers. The dependent variable in the left-hand panel is a dummy which equals 1 if a
taxpayer faces the limit on the tax liability in year t, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable
in the right-hand panel is the share of exempt assets over total reported assets.
N: 89,265 obs
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Figure 6: Effect on income and long-term capital gains
Notes: Both figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with real atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from using
alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects. Controls
-b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively, interacted
with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The estimation
sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported
in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered
by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations
to avoid outliers. The dependent variable in the left-hand panel is the log of taxable income. The




Figure 7: Effect on real estate
Notes: All figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with real atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from using
alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects. Controls
-b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively, interacted
with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The estimation
sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported
in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered
by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations
to avoid outliers. The dependent variable for the panels (from left to right) is the share of
(all/taxable/exempt) real estate over total reported assets.
N: 89,265 obs
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Figure 8: Effect on unlisted companies and business assets
Notes: All figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with real atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from using
alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects. Controls
-b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively, interacted
with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The estimation
sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported
in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered
by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations
to avoid outliers. The dependent variable for the panels (from left to right) is the share of
(all/taxable/exempt) unlisted companies and business assets over total reported assets.
N: 89,265 obs
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Figure 9: Effect on listed equity and investment funds
Notes: All figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with real atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from using
alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects. Controls
-b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively, interacted
with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The estimation
sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported
in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered
by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations
to avoid outliers. The dependent variable for the panels (from left to right) is the share of
(all/taxable/exempt) listed equity and investment funds over total reported assets.
N: 89,265 obs
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Figure 10: Effect on bank accounts and bonds
Notes: The figure provides coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with real atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from using
alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects. Controls
-b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively, interacted
with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The estimation
sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported
in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered
by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations




Figure 11: Effect on gifts
Notes: The figure provides coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with real atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from using
alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects. Controls
-b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively, interacted
with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The estimation
sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported
in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered
by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations
to avoid outliers. The dependent variable is a dummy which equals 1 if a taxpayer makes a gift
- declared to the Catalan Tax Agency - in year t, and 0 otherwise.
N: 89,265 obs
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Figure 12: Heterogeneous effects on taxable wealth
Notes: Both figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals resulting from
specification (1) using the set of control variables -c- and real atr11i as the explanatory variable.
For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. Each figure shows three different
estimates: “All”, obtained when using the full estimation sample, and “Business-Low(High)”,
comprising those taxpayers whose 2011 share of unlisted companies and business assets over total
reported assets is below(above) the median. The estimation sample is a balanced panel of the
50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax
returns every year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5%
of income and wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations to avoid outliers. The
dependent variable is the log of taxable wealth. It is (not) adjusted for the mechanical effect
-ME- in the right-(left-) hand panel.
N: 88,325 obs (All); 45,630 obs (Business-Low); 42,695 (Business-High).
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Figure 13: Heterogeneous effects on total reported wealth
Notes: Both figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals resulting from
specification (1) using the set of control variables -c- and real atr11i as the explanatory variable.
For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. Each figure shows three different
estimates: “All”, obtained when using the full estimation sample, and “Business-Low(High)”,
comprising those taxpayers whose 2011 share of unlisted companies and business assets over total
reported assets is below(above) the median. The estimation sample is a balanced panel of the
50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax
returns every year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5%
of income and wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations to avoid outliers. The
dependent variable is the log of total reported wealth. It is (not) adjusted for the mechanical
effect -ME- in the right-(left-) hand panel.
N: 89,265 obs (All); 45,700 obs (Business-Low); 43,565 (Business-High).
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Figure 14: Heterogeneous effects on potential tax avoidance strategies
Notes: Both figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals resulting from
specification (1) using the set of control variables -c- and real atr11i as the explanatory variable.
For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. Each figure shows three different
estimates: “All”, obtained when using the full estimation sample, and “Business-Low(High)”,
comprising those taxpayers whose 2011 share of unlisted companies and business assets over total
reported assets is below(above) the median. The estimation sample is a balanced panel of the
50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax
returns every year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5%
of income and wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations to avoid outliers. The
dependent variable in the left-hand panel is a dummy which equals 1 if a taxpayer faces the limit
on the tax liability in year t, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in the right-hand panel is
the share of exempt assets over total reported assets.
N: 89,265 obs (All); 45,700 obs (Business-Low); 43,565 (Business-High).
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Figure 15: Heterogeneous effects on income and long-term capital gains
Notes: Both figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals resulting from
specification (1) using the set of control variables -c- and real atr11i as the explanatory variable.
For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. Each figure shows three different
estimates: “All”, obtained when using the full estimation sample, and “Business-Low(High)”,
comprising those taxpayers whose 2011 share of unlisted companies and business assets over total
reported assets is below(above) the median. The estimation sample is a balanced panel of the
50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax
returns every year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5%
of income and wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations to avoid outliers. The
dependent variable in the left-hand panel is the log of taxable income. The dependent variable
in the right-hand panel is the share of long term capital gains over taxable income.
N: 69,405 obs (All); 35,980 obs (Business-Low); 33,425 (Business-High).
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Figure 16: Heterogeneous effects on real estate
Notes: All figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals resulting from spec-
ification (1) using the set of control variables -c- and real atr11i as the explanatory variable. For a
detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. Each figure shows three different estimates:
“All”, obtained when using the full estimation sample, and “Business-Low(High)”, comprising
those taxpayers whose 2011 share of unlisted companies and business assets over total reported
assets is below(above) the median. The estimation sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest
taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every
year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5% of income and
wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations to avoid outliers. The dependent vari-
able for the panels (from left to right) is the share of (all/taxable/exempt) real estate over total
reported assets.
N: 89,265 obs (All); 45,700 obs (Business-Low); 43,565 (Business-High).
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Figure 17: Heterogeneous effects on unlisted companies and business assets
Notes: All figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals resulting from spec-
ification (1) using the set of control variables -c- and real atr11i as the explanatory variable. For a
detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. Each figure shows three different estimates:
“All”, obtained when using the full estimation sample, and “Business-Low(High)”, comprising
those taxpayers whose 2011 share of unlisted companies and business assets over total reported
assets is below(above) the median. The estimation sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest
taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every
year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5% of income and
wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations to avoid outliers. The dependent variable
for the panels (from left to right) is the share of (all/taxable/exempt) unlisted companies and
business assets over total reported assets.
N: 89,265 obs (All); 45,700 obs (Business-Low); 43,565 (Business-High).
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Figure 18: Heterogeneous effects on listed equity and investment funds
Notes: All figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals resulting from spec-
ification (1) using the set of control variables -c- and real atr11i as the explanatory variable. For a
detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. Each figure shows three different estimates:
“All”, obtained when using the full estimation sample, and “Business-Low(High)”, comprising
those taxpayers whose 2011 share of unlisted companies and business assets over total reported
assets is below(above) the median. The estimation sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest
taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every
year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5% of income and
wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations to avoid outliers. The dependent variable
for the panels (from left to right) is the share of (all/taxable/exempt) listed equity and invest-
ment funds over total reported assets.
N: 89,265 obs (All); 45,700 obs (Business-Low); 43,565 (Business-High).
54
Figure 19: Heterogeneous effects on bank accounts and bonds
Notes: The figure provides coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals resulting from
specification (1) using the set of control variables -c- and real atr11i as the explanatory variable.
For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. Three different estimates are shown:
“All”, obtained when using the full estimation sample, and “Business-Low(High)”, comprising
those taxpayers whose 2011 share of unlisted companies and business assets over total reported
assets is below(above) the median. The estimation sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest
taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every
year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5% of income and
wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations to avoid outliers. The dependent variable
is the share of bank accounts and bonds over total reported assets.
N: 89,265 obs (All); 45,700 obs (Business-Low); 43,565 (Business-High).
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Figure 20: Heterogeneous effects on gifts
Notes: The figure provides coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals resulting from
specification (1) using the set of control variables -c- and real atr11i as the explanatory variable.
For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. Three different estimates are shown:
“All”, obtained when using the full estimation sample, and “Business-Low(High)”, comprising
those taxpayers whose 2011 share of unlisted companies and business assets over total reported
assets is below(above) the median. The estimation sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest
taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every
year between 2011-15. Standard errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5% of income and
wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations to avoid outliers. The dependent variable
is a dummy which equals 1 if a taxpayer makes a gift - declared to the Catalan Tax Agency - in
year t, and 0 otherwise.
N: 89,265 obs (All); 45,700 obs (Business-Low); 43,565 (Business-High).
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Appendix A Business exemption
In 1994 the government introduced an exemption for business assets and closely
held business shares in an effort at fostering entrepreneurial investment.76 In 1998,
this exemption was extended to listed shares.77 However, certain conditions have
to be met for these tax incentives to apply. The main requirement for the business
asset exemption is that at least 50% of the taxpayers total income comes from
business activities. The exemption for company shares, both listed and unlisted,
applies when: (i) the company carries out an economic activity78, (ii) the taxpayer
owns at least 5%79 of the company individually or 20% when considering the fam-
ily group, and (iii) one of the family members is engaged in the management of
the company and receives a retribution for these functions that represents at least
50% of their labour and business income (analogous retributions coming from other
companies which also satisfy these conditions are excluded from the computation).
In the case of the exemption for business shares, not only the taxpayer but the
entire family group can exempt their holdings from the wealth tax if they satisfy
the stipulated conditions.
According to the law, the exemption only extends as far as the share of net assets
directly involved in the economic activity of the company. In this regard, although
the legislation provides general instructions to determine when assets are directly
involved in the economic activity80, ultimately it is the taxpayer’s responsibility
to demonstrate this circumstance in the case of a tax audit being conducted.
Indeed, the way the Law was designed and its related case law initially developed
greatly benefited those taxpayers able to apply the exemption. By creating the
correct holding structure, a taxpayer could basically include any kind of wealth
as indirect shares, since the conditions only needed to be satisfied with respect to
the direct holding.8182 It was not until 2007 that the legislation included the need
to assess the portion of net assets directly involved in the economic activity of the
indirect shares.83
76Act 22/1993, December 29th, later developed by Royal Decree 2481/1994, December 23rd.
77Act 66/1997, December 30th.
78Article 4.8. from Act 19/1991, June 6th, and Royal Decree 1704/1999, November 5th,
specify the requirements to determine whether a company carries out an economic activity and
all other conditions needed to apply this wealth tax exemption.
7920% during 1994 and 15% until 2002. The current ownership share is well below the 25%
share required in other countries such as France or Sweden (OECD, 2018).
80Article 6.3. from Royal Decree 1704/1999, November 5th.
81The Wealth Tax Law foresees that a company which owns at least 5% of other corporations
with the aim of managing their shares is carrying out an economic activity, and these shares are
considered as being directly involved in the economic activity.
82SICAVs (Investment companies with variable capital) are the only asset type to have had
their right to be exempt from the wealth tax denied by the Supreme Court, regardless of owner-
ship via indirect shares. Indeed, this is justified by the fact that the Wealth Tax Law specifically
excludes assets of this type from exemption. See Supreme Court Resolutions 21/05/2013 (Rec.
2689/2011), 03/06/13 (Rec. 2248/2011) and 16/07/2015 (Rec. 171/2014) for further informa-
tion.
83Reform approved by Act 35/2006, November 28th.
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Appendix B Descriptive Figures
Figure A1: Average tax rates, 2011
Notes: Panel a) shows the average tax rates of taxpayers who only apply main-dwelling ex-
emption, if any. Panel b) shows the average tax rates of taxpayers who also report business
exemptions (including both listed and unlisted companies). Panel c) shows the average tax rates
of taxpayers who face the limit on tax liability. Panel d) shows the average tax rates of tax-
payers who satisfy both cases b) and c). The real average tax rate is computed as the wealth
tax liability over total reported wealth for 2011, in percentage points. Maximum average tax
rate is computed applying the 2011 statutory tax rates to the overall stock of reported wealth
exceeding the minimum threshold (700,000e), assuming there are no wealth exemptions and the
limit on tax liability does not apply. The percentages next to the vertical dashed lines show the
cumulative distribution of 2011 Catalan wealth taxpayers along total reported wealth.
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Figure A2: Frequency of gifts made during the last 8 weeks of the year
between 2009 and 2014
Notes: This figure only includes gifts reported to the Catalan Tax Agency.
Figure A3: 2011 average asset portfolio by taxpayer groups:
Business-Low vs. Business-High
Notes: “Business-Low(High)” taxpayers are those whose 2011 share of unlisted companies and
business assets is below(above) the median. The estimation sample is a balanced panel of the
50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax
returns every year between 2011-15.
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Figure A4: Differences between “Business-Low” and “Business-High” taxpayers
(a) 2011 income distribution
(b) 2011 age distribution
Notes: Both figures provide proportion estimates and 95% confidence intervals from the distri-
bution of each taxpayer group across 2011 income deciles (panel a) and age groups (panel b).
“Business-Low(High)” taxpayers are those whose 2011 share of unlisted companies and business
assets is below(above) the median. The estimation sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest
taxpayers, according to the stock of wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every
year between 2011-15.
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Appendix C Descriptive Tables
Table A1: Relation between average tax rates and taxpayers’






income companies and bonds
all 5y filers all 5y filers all 5y filers all 5y filers all 5y filers all 5y filers
No controls
2011 atr 0.4695*** 0.4505*** 1.1775*** 1.1321*** 0.0552*** 0.0564*** 0.1949*** 0.1979*** -0.6016*** -0.5984*** 0.2713*** 0.2678***
(0.0174) (0.0189) (0.0255) (0.0269) (0.0067) (0.0074) (0.0066) (0.0071) (0.0088) (0.0094) (0.0062) (0.0067)
“Decile” controls
2011 atr 0.0224** 0.0262** 0.0917*** 0.0754*** -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0163*** -0.0164*** -0.0201*** -0.0219*** 0.0075*** 0.0068***
(0.0107) (0.0113) (0.0146) (0.0150) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0019)
“Narrow” controls
2011 atr -0.0025 0.0060 0.0100 -0.0032 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001
(0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0102) (0.0109) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Dep. var. mean 14.9554 14.9412 11.3635 11.3458 0.2815 0.2877 0.1628 0.1643 0.3127 0.3009 0.1855 0.1901
Observations 20,371 17,853 18,083 16,008 20,371 17,853 20,371 17,853 20,371 17,853 20,371 17,853
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by marriages, in parentheses. Only taxpayers in the top 50% of the observed
2011 wealth distribution are considered. Top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded from the estimations
to avoid outliers. All estimates refer to all 2011 taxpayers in the top 50%; 5y filers estimates refer to those who filed
wealth tax returns every year between 2011 and 2015. The last four dependent variables are expressed in shares over
total assets. The number of observations related to Log of taxable income estimates is not as high because some
taxpayers do not report information on income. “Decile” and “Narrow” controls include non-parametric variables
which capture taxpayers’ wealth, income, asset portfolio, age, indebtedness share and tax amnesty participation. For
a detailed definition of these controls see Section 4.2.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Table A2: Statutory tax rates, 2011











Appendix D Main estimation results using
“estimated atr” as the
explanatory variable
Figure A5: Effect on taxable wealth
Notes: Both figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with estimated atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from
using alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects.
Controls -b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively,
interacted with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The
estimation sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of
wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard
errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded
from the estimations to avoid outliers. The dependent variable is the log of taxable wealth. It is
(not) adjusted for the mechanical effect -ME- in the right (left) panel.
N: 88,325 obs
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Figure A6: Effect on total reported wealth
Notes: Both figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with estimated atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from
using alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects.
Controls -b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively,
interacted with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The
estimation sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of
wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard
errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded
from the estimations to avoid outliers. The dependent variable is the log of total reported wealth.
It is (not) adjusted for the mechanical effect -ME- in the right (left) panel.
N: 89,265 obs
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Figure A7: Effect on potential tax avoidance strategies
Notes: Both figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with estimated atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from
using alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects.
Controls -b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively,
interacted with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The
estimation sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of
wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard
errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded
from the estimations to avoid outliers. The dependent variable in the left-hand panel is a dummy
which equals 1 if a taxpayer faces the limit on the tax liability in year t, and 0 otherwise. The




Figure A8: Effect on income and long-term capital gains
Notes: Both figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with estimated atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from
using alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects.
Controls -b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively,
interacted with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The
estimation sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of
wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard
errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded
from the estimations to avoid outliers. The dependent variable in the left-hand panel is the log
of taxable income. The dependent variable in the right-hand panel is the share of long term
capital gains over taxable income.
N: 69,405 obs
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Figure A9: Effect on real estate
Notes: All figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with estimated atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from
using alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects.
Controls -b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively,
interacted with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The
estimation sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of
wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard
errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded
from the estimations to avoid outliers. The dependent variable for the panels (from left to right)
is the share of (all/taxable/exempt) real estate over total reported assets.
N: 89,265 obs
66
Figure A10: Effect on unlisted companies and business assets
Notes: All figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with estimated atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from
using alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects.
Controls -b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively,
interacted with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The
estimation sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of
wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard
errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded
from the estimations to avoid outliers. The dependent variable for the panels (from left to right)




Figure A11: Effect on listed equity and investment funds
Notes: All figures provide coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with estimated atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from
using alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects.
Controls -b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively,
interacted with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The
estimation sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of
wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard
errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded
from the estimations to avoid outliers. The dependent variable for the panels (from left to right)
is the share of (all/taxable/exempt) listed equity and investment funds over total reported assets.
N: 89,265 obs
68
Figure A12: Effect on bank accounts and bonds
Notes: The figure provides coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with estimated atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from
using alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects.
Controls -b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively,
interacted with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The
estimation sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of
wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard
errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded
from the estimations to avoid outliers. The dependent variable is the share of bank accounts and
bonds over total reported assets.
N: 89,265 obs
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Figure A13: Effect on gifts
Notes: The figure provides coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from specification
(1) with estimated atr11i as the explanatory variable. The three sets of estimates result from
using alternative control variables. Controls -a- only include individual and time fixed effects.
Controls -b- and -c- include, additionally, the set of “decile” and “narrow” controls, respectively,
interacted with time dummies. For a detailed definition of these variables see Section 4.2. The
estimation sample is a balanced panel of the 50% richest taxpayers, according to the stock of
wealth reported in 2011, who filed wealth tax returns every year between 2011-15. Standard
errors are clustered by marriages and top 0.5% of income and wealth distributions are excluded
from the estimations to avoid outliers. The dependent variable is a dummy which equals 1 if a
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